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INTRODUCTION
One notable exception to the general rule that-courts may hold
manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their defectively
designed products is the law governing prescription drugs and de-
vices. Makers of prescription drugs and devices produce their wares
knowing that a certain percentage of them will injure, or even kill, con-
sumers.' Of course, drug manufacturers strive to keep this number as
low as possible, because reputation and public perception carry great
economic consequences.2 Nevertheless, every year scores of unwitting
men, women, and children are injured or killed by the very drugs or
devices to which they turned for relief from discomfort and disease. 3
One problem facing the American Law Institute ("ALI") when it cre-
ated the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 was how to establish a universal
rule of strict products liability, while at the same time encouraging the
manufacturers of such "unavoidably unsafe products"5 to continue to
supply vital, yet sometimes injurious, pharmaceuticals. As a solution,
the ALI promulgated comment k, which urged that courts grant the
makers of pharmaceutical products a blanket exemption from this
new regime of strict liability.6
Until recently, most courts adhered to the edict of comment k
and uniformly refused to hold drug makers liable for drug-related in-
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILT § 8 reporters' note, cmt. f
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ] ("Unlike most products,
which confer essentially the same benefits to all users, prescription drugs and medical de-
vices have the capacity to do great harm or great good depending on the patient.").
2 See STEvEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CMvLJUSTICE, PRODUCT LLABILrIY AND THE Eco-
NOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVIES 86 (1993) (asserting that safety con-
cerns regarding a pharmaceutical product may cause doctors to stop prescribing it,
patients to avoid seeking treatment, or patients to fail to fill prescriptions). See also HER-
BERT BuR-ot.Z, THE FDA FoLLES 43-45 (1994) (reporting that the public revulsion
prompted by photographs of European thalidomide victims resulted in increased govern-
ment regulation of the pharmaceutical industry's practices and prices.).
3 See BuRuHoLz, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that even normal dosages of aspirin can
prove to be deadly in some children).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
5 Id. § 402A cmt. k.
6 Id.
19971
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juries.7 Courts held this stance even when plaintiffs could prove the
drug directly caused injury.8 So long as the maker: (1) manufactured
the drug in compliance with its FDA-approved design, and (2) the
maker adequately warned of all known dangers, side-effects, and con-
tra-indications, the court could not lay the cost of the injury at the
drug maker's door.9 The rationale for the judicial system's reticence
to apply design liability for drug-induced injury boils down to a com-
mon-sense trade-off-many, if not most, drugs cannot be made com-
pletely safe.' 0 If courts hold drug companies liable for every injury
their products cause, they will be disinclined to market their product,
and as a result society will suffer." According to Steven Garber of the
7 Only design defect claims are granted immunity by comment k. The viability of
claims that a prescription product was improperly manufactured or that the maker failed
to warn of risks associated with it is well established. SeeTeresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription
Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENNu. L. Rn,. 1357, 1369-70 (1994) (assert-
ing that the prescription product manufacturing defect and failure to warn standards
adopted by the Restatement (Third) are not controversial, but rather are "well-settled").
8 See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) ("Until recently, most
courts refrained from applying a design defect theory to products liability cases involving
prescription drugs.").
9 See, e.g.,Johnson v. American Cynamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986). In this case,
the plaintiff contracted polio via his daughter's inoculation with a Sabin-type live virus
vaccine. The plaintiff claimed that because the non-infectious Salk-type killed virus vaccine
existed, the maker of the live vaccine should be held strictly liable for defective design.
Relying on comment k, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the live virus vaccine was a
"useful and desirable product" and that "[plublic policy requires that the mere manufac-
ture of the vaccine not be actionable on the ground of design defect.... As a matter of law
there is no... design defect in the product at issue .... " Id. at 1323-24.
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 reporters' note, cmt. f ("Unlike most
products, which confer essentially the same benefits to all users, prescription drugs and
medical devices have the capacity to do great harm or great good depending on the
patient.").
11 See id. § 8 cmt. b (asserting that protection of prescription drug designs from strict
liability claims "reflects concerns over the possible negative effects of judicially imposed
liability on the cost and availability of valuable medical technology"). Courts and commen-
tators treat as axiomatic the notion that strict liability for drug design will have a negative
effect on the price and availability of prescription products. See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 94
("[D] rug manufacturers might stop producing valuable drugs because of lost profits result-
ing from lawsuits.. . ."); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Pre-
scription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 76, 96 (1994) (noting that a driving force behind section 8(c) of the Restatement
(Third) is the notion that "[aipplying design liability to drugs, thereby raising the costs of
drugs and discouraging their development, would . . . fail to serve society's interests");
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. Rzv. 277, 289 (1985) (asserting that "the tort system's vagaries will ultimately
drive mass immunization programs out of the private sector altogether"); Harvey L. Kaplan
et al., Third Restatement: New Prescription for Makers of Drugs and Medical Devices, 61 DEF.
COUNS. J. 64, 74 (1994) (arguing that prohibiting of design defect claims will ensure that
"drugs and medical devices would remain available and affordable because manufacturers
would have some assurance that the designs of their FDA-approved products would not
later be deemed defective by layjurors"); Emily C. Aschinger, Note, The Selling of the Perfect
Breast: Silicone, Surgeons, and Strict Liability, 61 UMKC L. REv. 399, 406 (1992) ("If manufac-
turers ... were to be held strictly liable for [drug design) defects, the advances made in
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Rand Institute for Civil Justice, "Reports from independent panels
conclude that product liability has substantially discouraged innova-
tion efforts in vaccines, contraceptives, and orphan drugs. There have
also been claims that product liability concerns hinder development
efforts in biotechnology, especially for vaccines in general and an
AIDS vaccine in particular."' 2 However, despite warnings of the po-
tentially dire consequences of applying product liability to drug de-
sign,' 3 judicial restraint is weakening. Most jurisdictions have begun
to allow juries, in certain circumstances, to consider holding drug
makers liable for injuries caused by their products, based on injured
plaintiffs' allegations that the maker's defective design of the pharma-
ceutical product caused their injury.14 As a result, the vitality of com-
ment k has come under serious question.
In its proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, the
ALI attempts to breathe new life into the all-but-moribund comment
k.15 Section 8(c) of the proposed Restatement (Third) adopts a "reason-
able health care provider" standard. This section directs courts to es-
chew entertaining drug design defect claims, so long as the defense
can prove the existence of one group of patients for whom the drug
(or prescription device) in question is the product of choice. 16 How-
modem medicine would come to a halt."); Andrew Barrett, Note, The Past and Future of
Comment k: Section (4)(b)(4) of the Tentative Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts-Is it the Beginning
of a New Erafor Prescription Drugs?, 45 SYRACUSE L. R.v. 1291, 1805 (1995) ("Strict liability
would stifle society's desire to encourage manufacturers in the research, development and
manufacture of ethical drugs.").
However, some commentators have expressed skepticism of this position. See, e.g., Jo-
seph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 853 (1983) (arguing that strict liability for drug design defects would actu-
ally result in more efficient allocation of producers' funds in the form of preventive safety
research).
12 GAmER, supra note 2, at 144 (citations omitted).
13 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479-80 (Cal. 1988) (listing "examples of
[therapeutic] products which have greatly increased in price or have been withdrawn or
withheld from the market because of the fear that their producers would be held liable for
large judgments"). See also AvaJ. Abramowitz, Blueprint for Trouble, BaEm, Fall 1986, at 16
(asserting that because of the costs associated with strict liability claims "[v]accines are not
being sold").
14 See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 reporter's note, cmt. f.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k.
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8(c) reads:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeu-
tic benefits so that no reasonable health care provider, knowing of such foresee-
able risks and therapeutic benefits, would prescribe the drug or medical device for
any class of patients.
(emphasis added). See also id. § 8 cmt. b ("[A] prescription drug or medical device that
provides net benefits to any class of patients is not defective in design even if it is harmful
to other patients."). It has come to the author's attention that § 8 of the proposed Restate-
ment Third is scheduled to be renumbered as § 6. Since no significant changes are, to the
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ever, given both the fervor with which some jurisdictions have rejected
comment k,17 and the contrasting stubbornness shown by at least one
jurisdiction in clinging to comment k blanket immunity for pharma-
ceutical products,' 8 it is unclear whether the courts will embrace the
standard proposed in section 8(c). Failure of the jurisdictions to fol-
low a single standard in adjudicating pharmaceutical design defect
cases could have serious repercussions on the development and sale of
medicines and medical devices in this country.'9
Part I of this Note analyzes the tensions and concerns that led to
the inclusion of comment k blanket immunity for pharmaceutical
products in section 402A of the Restatement (Second). Part II outlines
the various approaches to drug design defect claims taken by modern
courts. Part III examines the ALI's proposed solution to the confu-
sion that has developed in this area: section 8(c). Part IV argues that
although the underlying policy of proposed section 8(c) presents a
desirable compromise and has support from a limited number of
cases, its use of the words "reasonable health care provider" endan-
gers its adoption. Instead, this Note suggests that in section 8(c) the
ALI should adopt a "reasonable pharmaceutical products manufac-
turer" standard. This alternative finds support in the case law and
avoids the potentially fatal problems posed by the "reasonable health
care provider" standard.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMENT K BLANKET IMMUNITY
A. "Unavoidably Unsafe" Products
In 1965, the AU published its Restatement (Second) of Torts.20 In
section 402A of the Restatement (Second), the ALI undertook to define
and standardize strict products liability. To assert that section 402A
has been influential is an understatement. Two commentators write
that section 402A has "rise[n] to the dignity of holy writ" in many
jurisdictions. 21 According to section 402A, "special liability" arises on
the part of a "seller" of "any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer" for "physical harm
author's knowledge, proposed for new § 6(c), the analysis of this Note will apply to the new
section.
17 See infra Parts II.B-C.
18 See infra Part HA.
19 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4.
21 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. Ray. 1512, 1512 (1992) (noting that
thousands of reported cases have cited to section 402A since its inception). A recent
search of Westlaw revealed that over 3,400 cases available on that service cite to sec-
tion 402A. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Feb. 22, 1997).
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thereby caused," even when the "seller has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of his product. '22 Section 402A provided
the courts with the ammunition they needed to enforce change. After
the adoption of section 402A, in response to a manufacturer's argu-
ment that it had taken all possible care in the quality control of its
production, the courts could simply say, 'You argue that your actions
were reasonable. But the times have changed. Reasonableness is no
longer a defense in this new world of strict products liability."23
Courts reached this result despite the declaration of section 402A that
they should hold only "unreasonably dangerous" products to strict lia-
bility standards.2 4 The tension between these two standards-"unrea-
sonably dangerous" and "despite the exercise of all due care"-has
resulted in a maelstrom of conflicting opinions, especially in the areas
of strict products liability that arguably overlap with the negligence
doctrine of tort law: failure-to-warn and negligent desig. 2 5 Because
such claims were not common on the legal landscape at the time the
ALI wrote the Restatement (Second)26 it does not provide guidance on
how courts should approach them.2 7
Products liability proponents have offered a number of rationales
to support the necessity of the doctrine.28 They generally assert that
22 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4, § 402A. The pertinent parts of section 402A
read:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
23 See, e.g., Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter s Pespective A Proposed Agenda, 10 TouRo L.
REv. 5, 9-11 (1993).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A(1).
25 See David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability-Neglee Presumed: An Evolution, 67
TEx. L. REv. 851, 855 (1989) (claiming that "modem strict products liability theory is a
hybrid doctrine formed by grafting absolute liability onto negligence principles").
26 Twerski, supra note 23, at 9-11.
27 Barrett, supra note 11, at 1302 (asserting that the "question of distinguishing be-
tween a manufacturing defect and a design defect" was not adequately addressed until
1978).
28 Comment c of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A puts forth several
rationales for the doctrine:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to
be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:644
(1) the threat of liability will motivate the production of better, safer
products; 29 (2) the manufacturer/seller is in a better position than
the injured consumer to insure against the injury;30 and (3) the seller
can spread the costs of insurance and reparations for injuries across
the population in the form of increased prices.3 ' Although these pol-
icy considerations are widely accepted as the foundations of products
liability, they are not without their critics. 3 2 Furthermore, these basic
policy considerations do not easily address the problem of unavoid-
ably dangerous products-products that, when used as designed, will
injure or kill a known percentage of consumers.
B. Comment k Exempts Prescription Drugs From Design-Defect
Claims
Pharmaceutical drugs and devices comprise one category of prod-
ucts that challenges the underlying policies of strict products liabil-
ity.3 3 ALI members working on the Restatement (Second) worried that
holding the makers of pharmaceutical products liable for injuries un-
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to
and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is
forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is enti-
tled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the
proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
One commentator characterizes comment c as "somewhat vague," but offers the following
rationales:
(1) the product seller, by its position in the marketing chain, has a special
responsibility for product safety;,
(2) consumers expect safe products;
(3) helpless consumers are forced to rely on manufacturers for product
safety,
(4) product sellers are in a better position to spread the risk of loss; and
(5) product sellers can better afford to bear the loss of product injuries.
William Powers,Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILI. L. REv.
639, 644 n.16.
29 See id. at 644.
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A, cmt. c.
31 See Powers, supra note 28, at 645.
32 See id. at 643 (insisting that courts have failed to justify why products cases are
treated differently from negligence cases). See also Malcom Wheeler, The Need for Narrow
Tort Reform: Abolishing Strict Product Liability, in GTR. FOR THE STUDY OF Am. Bus., FORMAL
PUB. No. 98, PRODUCT LLABuaTu REFORM: DEBATING THE IssuES 23, 24 (Kenneth Chilton
ed., 1990) (arguing for a "nationwide abolition of strict product liability claims in design-
defect and inadequate-warning litigation").
33 See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1303-05. Barrett argues that the reporters of the Re-
statement (Second) struggled with the need to "show with specificity what [section 402A] did
not cover. The reporters believed that products exist which are unable to be made safe in
their ordinary use .... Such products were especially common in the field of prescription
drugs. Although unsafe, some drugs were still desirable. Enter comment k." Id. at 1304.
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avoidably caused by these products would severely hamper the devel-
opment and sale of essential drugs. They argued for exempting
"unavoidably unsafe" products, such as prescription drugs, from strict
liability.3 4 The resulting compromise was comment k, subtitled "Un-
avoidably Unsafe Products." The relevant portions of section 402A
comment k read as follows:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fullyjustified .... Such a product, prop-
erly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning,
is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.... The seller of
such products..,. is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.35
Using the Pasteur rabies vaccine, a prescription drug, as its com-
ment k example, the ALI cautioned the courts to remember the needs
of people who rely on prescription drugs to alleviate pain, for reliev-
ing the crippling effects of disease, or to stave off death, no matter
how briefly.36 In short, comment k urges the courts to remember that
not only is society prepared to risk injury or death in exchange for the
clear benefits of pharmaceutical products, but that reasonable pa-
tients are also clearly willing to take such risks in exchange for possibly
ameliorating their afflictions. The ALI, it seems, considered the con-
sequences of holding pharmaceutical makers liable for injuries flow-
ing naturally and foreseeably from their products,37 imagined a world
where drugs and other critical yet potentially harmful products were
unavailable to the public,38 found such an eventuality unacceptable,
and granted "unavoidably unsafe" products immunity as a class.39
C. Does Comment k Apply Only to Prescription Drugs?
The case law has not entirely settled the question of whether
medical products other than drugs and vaccines should benefit from
34 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988) (citing 38 A.LI. PROC.
19, 90-92, 98 (1961)).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k.
36 See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d. 89, 95-96 (Utah 1991).
37 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 475.
38 See id.
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k.
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comment k's special treatment.40 However, the drug companies have
strongly advocated that the courts bring their devices under comment
k's protective blanket.41 Courts that have elected to extend comment
k protection to devices such as pacemakers, 42 breast implants,43 penile
implants,44 and even to an "antibacterial surgical drape,"4 have rea-
soned that (1) such products can be obtained only by prescription;6
and (2) like prescription drugs, prescription products' main functions
are to improve the patient's condition, to alleviate his or her pain and
suffering, or to postpone his or her death.47 Those courts that have
struggled with whether to grant comment k protection to medically
necessary devices while withholding it from arguably cosmetic im-
plants have avoided segregating cosmetic devices from non-cosmetic
ones, and instead have extended protection to all of these devices. 48
According to Richard L. Cupp, these jurisdictions "generally agree
that the reasoning behind immunizing prescription drugs applies
equally well to most medical devices."49 Moreover, proposed section
8(c) of the Restatement (Third) specifically refers to "prescription
drug[s] and medical device[s]" as forming a "special product mar-
ket."50 Thus, this Note considers medical devices indistinguishable
from prescription drugs, despite the "optional," or "cosmetic" quality
of certain "non-therapeutic" medical devices.51 This inclusion of med-
ical devices has been attacked by critics who at the least would prefer
to see "cosmetic" prescription products exempt from comment k pro-
tection 52 or at most would prefer to see all drugs treated the same way
as any other product.55
40 See Cupp, supra note 11, at 80-82
41 See id. at 83-84.
42 See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (4th Cir. 1984).
43 See Coordination Proceedings v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (Cal. Ct App.
1994).
44 See Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
45 See Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
46 See Cupp, supra note 11, at 83-84.
47 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d. 470, 478-79 (Cal. 1988).
48 See Cupp, supra note 11, at 84 n.48.
49 Id. at 84. For an overview of case law on the issue of treating prescription devices
the same as other prescription products, see Jennifer S.R. Lynn, Implantable Medical Devices:
A Survey of Products Liability Case Law, 38 MED. TRuAL TECH. Q. 44 (1992).
50 RFsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8(c). See also idL reporters' note cmt. d.
("Most of the cases that have addressed the issue have held that medical devices which
require a medical provider's prescription are subject to the same rules that apply to pre-
scription drugs.").
51 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Shaing Accountability for Breast Implants: Strict Products Lia-
bility and Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic Product Transactions, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1994) (discussing the increasing use of cosmetic medical
products).
52 See generally Aschinger, supra note 11 (arguing that the aggressive way manufactur-
ers market breast implants should disqualify them from design defect immunity).
53 See Cupp, supra note 11, at 110.
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II
THE CURRENT JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF COMMENT K: A
MIXED BAG.
A. "Pure" Comment k Jurisdictions
Some jurisdictions interpret comment k to mean what it says: that
there shall be no liability for the design of "unavoidably unsafe" prod-
ucts such as prescriptions drugs and devices.5 The leading "pure"
comment kjurisdiction is California, and the leading case on point in
that jurisdiction is Brown v. Superior Court.55 In Brown, the plaintiffs
were all daughters of women who had taken DES, a drug prescribed
for the prevention of miscarriages.5 6 The plaintiffs claimed that they
had been injured in utero by DES, and that the drug's design was
responsible for their injuries 5 7 The court refused to allow the plain-
tiffs to pursue their design defect claim, reasoning that "a drug manu-
facturer's liability for a defectively designed drug should not be
measured by the standards of strict liability... because of the public
interest in the development, availability, and reasonable price of
drugs."58 Thus, even if the plaintiffs could prove that the defendant's
product caused their harm, the special nature of prescription drugs in
society59 absolutely precludes any claim that a pharmaceutical product
was defectively designed. Because no drug can be made completely
safe, the court reasoned that holding manufacturers liable for injuries
that inevitably arise from the use of their products would have devas-
tating effects on the production, distribution, and price of
pharmaceuticals. 60
California, however, did not always follow the pure form of com-
ment k. Indeed, the California Supreme Court's decision in Brown
was a direct reaction to the California Court of Appeals' ruling in
Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories.61 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged the
defendant's vaccine caused their injuries. Kearl held that, despite the
special treatment seemingly prescribed for drugs by comment k, de-
fective drug design claims are mixed questions of law and fact that
should be decided on a case-by-case basis on "evidence... taken by
54 See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) ("We agree with
the principles that comment k embodies, that manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous
products should not be liable for a claim of design defect. We are persuaded that all
prescription drugs should be classified as unavoidably dangerous in design ... .
55 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
56 Id. at 472.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 477.
59 See ii at 478-79.
60 See id. at 479-80.
61 172 Cal. App. 3d 812 (Ct. App. 1985).
1997]
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the trial judge out of the presence of the jury."62 The judge should
then determine:
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer
an exceptionally important benefit that made its availability highly
desirable; (2) whether the then-existing risk posed by the product
was both "substantial" and "unavoidable"; and (3) whether the in-
terest in availability . . .outweighs the interest in promoting en-
hanced accountability through strict liability design defect
review."63
Therefore, to evaluate the evidence, the Kearl court followed the risk/
benefit test applied in the non-pharmaceutical case of Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.64 According to the Kearl court, comment k should only
apply if the benefit of the drug outweighed the risk associated with it.
Comment k would thus exempt a beneficial drug from liability for the
injury it caused. Otherwise, the maker should be held liable under a
defective design test.65
The Brown court, however, saw a great danger in this approach.
It asserted that drugs are a special product, produced to alleviate pain,
reduce suffering, and sustain life.66 By contrast, other products are
meant to improve the quality of life, with consumer satisfaction and
the enhancement of convenience as their major goals.67 A slow-down
in the development of faster in-line skates or more powerful chain
saws resulting from producers' concerns with liability is one thing; de-
creased research and production of pharmaceuticals due to products
liability concerns is quite another.68 The Brown court perceived that
judicial meddling in the drug design process would mean that while
today's unavoidable victims of medicine were being compensated, vast
groups of patients would ultimately be deprived of potentially lifesav-
ing medications and devices that have yet to be developed. 69 Unwill-
ing to interfere with the decisionmaking process behind the
production of new drugs and medical devices, the Brown court in-
voked comment k. In doing so, the California Supreme Court made
clear its choice to stay out of the business of conducting "mini-trials"70
to adjudicate the reasonableness of pharmaceutical design. So long as
the drug was properly manufactured and accompanied by an ade-
quate warning of the risks known to the manufacturer at the time of
62 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 481 (citing Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829-
30 (Ct. App. 1985)).
63 Id.
64 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
65 See Kear 172 Cal. App 3d. at 829-30.
66 Brown, 751 P.2d at 478.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 479-80.
70 Id. at 481.
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sale,71 it was not, by definition, defectively designed. This is still the
law in California, as well as in Utah.72
B. Tears in the Immunity Blanket
Although California has traditionally led the development of
strict products liability doctrine,73 "the vast majority of jurisdictions"
that have considered the question of product liability for pharmaceu-
tical products have explicitly refused to follow California's approach
of blanket immunity from design defect claims for prescription drugs
and devices.74 Even though Brown explicitly overruled Kearlin Califor-
nia,75 most other jurisdictions still apply Kearl as good law.7 6 One of
the leading decisions advocating the Kearl case-by-case approach to
prescription drug design-defect claims is Toner v. Lederle Laboratories.77
In that case, the plaintiff was allegedly paralyzed by the defendant's
vaccine.7 8 The plaintiff argued that the defendant could have and
should have developed a safer vaccine.7 9 He claimed negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty.80 The jury found the maker
liable for negligence, but not liable under strict products liability or
breach of warranty. 81 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
turned to the Idaho Supreme Court for guidance on the controversy
via certified question.82 The Idaho Supreme Court responded that a
defendant could, indeed, be held negligent in its designing of a phar-
maceutical product.83 Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court held
that comment k analysis was generally the same as a typical negligence
analysis.84 In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court linked strict drug-
71 See ida at 480-81.
72 See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). In this decision, the Utah
Supreme Court explicitly followed the reasoning of Brown, stating: "We agree with Brown
that the case-by-case method... articulated in Kearl is unworkable .... We find the Brown
result more in line with the public policy considerations in the important area of pharma-
ceutical product design." Id. at 95.
73 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 473-74.
74 Barrett, supra note 11, at 1314.
75 Brown, 751 P.2d at 477.
76 See, e.g., Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1995). See
also Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881 (Okla. 1994). The Oklahoma Supreme Court
listed a total of 18 states that followed the "risk-benefit" approach to comment k: Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, NewJersey, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah. Id at 886 & n.2.
77 828 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1987).
78 Id. at 511.
79 S, id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 512 ("'[Tjhe determination under comment k that the design of a prod-
uct is unavoidably unsafe and yet affords benefits outweighing its risks varies little from the
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design claims to a negligence-based, case-by-case, risk-benefit stan-
dard. Consequently, in Idaho, the finder of fact in drug design cases
will be asked to determine whether the benefits of the drug in ques-
tion outweighed the risks associated with it.85 If not, then the court
can deem the manufacturer negligent in its design of the drug, and
the defendant will be unable to invoke the blanket protection of com-
ment k.
The following year, the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied the
risk-benefit test to a drug design-defect claim in Castrignano v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons.86 As in Brown, the claim was brought by daughters of
women who had ingested DES during pregnancy.8 7 Castrignano, un-
like Brown, held that the apparent benefits of the drug must exceed its
apparent risks if the maker is to invoke comment k protection from
liability for the injury it caused.8 Under the Castrignano rule, if the
risks of the drug outweigh the benefits it confers, then the claim of
defective design may stand.89
The instability evident in court decisions and the confusion
among jurisdictions is caused by a central tension.90 On the one
hand, courts proffer a protective blanket to drug makers to induce
them to bear the risks involved in developing and marketing new
drugs. On the other hand, courts also wield the whip of liability for
makers' failure to follow new developments and discoveries. That
courts often give some deference to the FDA drug approval process9'
only adds to this tension. Moreover, allowing juries to decide, on a
case-by-case basis, whether or not a given drug's risks outweighed its
benefits is likely to lead to inconsistent results92 and to plunge drug
determination under negligence law that the designing and marketing of the product was
reasonably done.'") (quoting Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 310-11 (Idaho 1987)).
85 See id. ("'[U]nder negligence analysis, the utility of the act depends upon the value
of the interest advanced, the extent to which it is advanced, and the opportunity for a less
dangerous course of conduct... .'") (quoting Toner, 732 P.2d at 310-11).
86 546 A.2d 775 (RI. 1988).
87 See id. at 776.
88 I& at 781.
89 See id.
90 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1365-66 ("Certainly the case can be made that the law
is unclear and confused with respect to pharmaceutical liability .... [N]early thirty years
after the adoption of section 402A, significant points of dispute and uncertainty remain in
this area of the law."). See also Cupp, supra note 11, at 79 ("Courts have adopted a broad
range of conflicting interpretations of... [comment k]."); Barrett, supra note 11, at 1305
("[T]here are multiple interpretations of the wording of comment k .... ."); Patrick H.
O'Neil, Jr., Note, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and the Design Defect Theory: An Analysis of Ap-
plying CommentKto Strict Liability and Negligence Claims, 15 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rv. 1049, 1056
(1989) ("[Vjastiy different approaches have left the application of Comment k in a con-
stant state of flux.").
91 See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 94-96 (Utah 1991) (detailing the
statutory role of the FDA in the drug approval process).
92 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 (Cal. 1988)
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and medical device manufacturers into a world of uncertainty.93 Drug
manufacturers need to know the standard by which their acts will be
judged. Manufacturers need to know if it is unreasonable to market
any medication that results in any fatality or injury, even if that same
drug is a lifesaver for certain patients.94 One could easily imagine that
a jury, faced with the tragic facts of the case before it, could be con-
vinced that the act of marketing an injury-causing drug was inherently
unreasonable, simply because the drug did indeed cause the injury its
maker knew would occur in a certain percentage of the people who
took it. Allowing this standard to control the medical industry would
jeopardize the marketing and the development of useful drugs and
medical devices. 95 The ALI recognized this problem in 1965 and at-
tempted to protect the supply of vital medical goods by including
comment k in section 402(A) of the Restatement (Second).96
There are three reasons why the majority of state courts have
moved away from the blanket protection provided by comment k.97
First, comment k is something less than a paradigm of clarity. Com-
ment k has proved difficult to interpret and apply.98 Comment k has
been called "a model of confusion" 99 and is said to have "befuddled
courts and scholars alike."' 00 Professor Aaron Twerski reports that he
regularly offers an "A" to any student in his course who can explain
comment k to him, but, so far, no one has received an "A" from Pro-
fessor Twerski in this way.' 0 '
93 See id.; see also Kaplan, supra note 11, at 71 (arguing that if juries are allowed to
subject drugs and prescription devices to risk-benefit analysis drug manufacturers "would
have no way of forecasting when or how often ajury would impose design defect liability,"
and that "[t] his unpredictability would discourage the development of new and potentially
efficacious drugs and medical devices").
94 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. b ("What may be harmful to one
patient may provide net benefits to another.").
95 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4.
97 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Impact of the New Products Liability Restatement on
Prescription Products, 50 FOOD & DRuG LJ. 399, 407 (1995) ("A majority of courts... [have]
ruled that the determination of whether strict liability should apply to a prescription prod-
uct should be made on a case-by-case basis."). See also Barrett, supra note 11, at 1306 (assert-
ing that the case-by-case risk-benefit analysis of prescription product design is followed "by
the majority of courts that have considered the issue").
98 See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) ("[C]omment k is un-
clear on the scope of its protection.").
99 Cupp, supra note 11, at 79.
100 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled
Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. Rzv. 1257, 1262 (1993). See also Schwartz, supra note 7, at
1366 ("[N]early thirty years after the adoption of section 402A [comment k], significant
points of dispute and uncertainty remain in this area of the law."). Moreover, Cupp re-
ports that "[w]riters have labeled.., comment [k] 'an enigma,' 'unclear in many respects,'
'poorly drafted and internally inconsistent,' 'a masterpiece of confusion and double-
speak,' and 'a monumental failure.'" Cupp, supra note 11, at 81-82 (footnotes omitted).
101 Twerski, supra note 23, at 15-16.
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A second reason why courts are likely to resist blanket immunity
for drug design defect claims is that immunity limits their discretion-
ary powers. Courts naturally perceive their systemic role to be adjudi-
cators of conflicts between individuals, 10 2 and blanket immunity
greatly reduces that role. Given the seriousness and scope of real and
potential injury posed by mass-marketed pharmaceuticals, courts wish-
ing to provide relief for injured individuals are likely to seek ways
around comment k.103
The third, and perhaps most important, reason for the erosion of
comment k immunity for manufacturers of medical products is that
this immunity can lead to patently unjust results. The Brown court
acknowledged this very problem, pointing out that to be consistent,
comment k would have to "grant the same protection from liability to
those who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin."
10 4
Blanket immunity for medical product design can protect products
that should, by all accounts, not be on the market.10 5 This sense of
potential injustice, combined with a reticence to abandon its social
role as adjudicator of tort claims, 10 6 has likely led courts away from
Brown blanket immunity and toward the risk/utility approach of Kearl
and Toner. When faced with a defective product design claim, many
courts have directed the finder of fact to engage in a case-by-case anal-
ysis of the overall product utility.10 7 This analysis includes considera-
tion of "any alternative product that would have as effectively
accomplished the full intended purpose of the.., product" at hand.'0 8
Courts have done this despite the California Supreme Court's strong
warning in Brown that prescription products are different from other
products, and thus should be treated differently.10 9
102 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.").
103 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1359-60 ("Courts are... concerned that liability rules
be sufficiently stringent to deter... [prescription product related] tragedies."). See also
Barrett, supra note 11, at 1325 (arguing that mostjurisdictions have rejected blanket immu-
nity for drug design defect claims because the "'blanket immunity' test is overreaching in
its efforts to protect the manufacturer [and] contradicts the entire reasoning behind strict
liability which was designed to protect the consumer.").
104 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988).
105 See id.
106 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1403 ("It is clear that the tort system forced the
Dalkon Shield to be withdrawn from the market, and it is also clear to most observers that
the tort system served the public interest in doing so.").
107 See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
108 Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal. App 3d. 812, 830 (Ct. App. 1985).
109 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988).
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C. Potentially Dangerous Imbalances in Other Jurisdictions
1. The "Exceptional Social Need" Approach
The Keari decision, which most courts still follow in defective
drug design claim cases,' 10 revolves around an analysis of the concept
of "benefit." Kearl is in accord with the influential decision rendered
in Barker v. LullEngineering Co.,"' a non-medical products case. How-
ever, given the basic differences between the nature and use of medi-
cal products and other products, it is unwise to follow the lead of non-
medical product cases to establish liability rules." 2 A drug's benefit
cannot be expressed simply in numerical terms, in the number of lives
saved, the number of white blood cells increased, or the number of
weeks remission is prolonged. Nor is "benefit" a social or moral term,
to be determined by applying local community standards." 3
Great uncertainty permeates how to define the "benefit" and
"risk" of medical products, and thus the reasonableness of marketing
the challenged medical product. Under this approach, judges are
able to impose a moral litmus test upon the product itself. If the
judge deems the product "essential" to society," 4 it receives comment
k blanket immunity; otherwise, it is relegated to the pile of "ordinary"
products, where its makers must fight a Barker v. Lull 1-5 risk-utility bat-
tle. This "exceptional need" test is best illustrated by Hill v. Searle Lab-
oratories, Inc." 6 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that defendant's
defectively-designed intrauterine device ("IUD") was the cause of her
injury." 7 The trial court granted the defendant comment k immunity
from the design claim."" On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that in order to qualify for comment k protection, the de-
fendant must first demonstrate an "exceptional social need"" 9 for the
product in question. Given the wide array of birth control methods
110 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
111 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
112 See Twerski, supra note 23, at 17 (arguing that "[i]t is clear that drug design cases
are a different animal" from non-drug design cases).
113 Cf Leslie A. Rubin, Note, Confronting a New Obstacle to Reproductive Choice: Encourag-
ing the Development of RU-486 through Reform of Products Liability Law, 18 N.Y.U. Rv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 131 (1990-91) (arguing that religious beliefs have been responsible for keep-
ing abortion-inducing drugs such as RU-486 off the market in the United States and other
countries, despite the fact that such drugs are safer than invasive abortion procedures).
114 See Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 830 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
ajudge considering whether to subject a pharmaceutical product to a design defect claim
should be empowered to determine, outside the presence of thejury, "whether the interest
in availability [of the product] ... outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accounta-
bility through strict liability design defect review").
115 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
116 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
117 See id. at 1065.
118 See i. at 1066.
119 Md at 1069.
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available in our society, including prescription birth control devices,
.non-prescription birth control devices, as well as "abstention, coitus
interruptus, and the rhythm system,"' 20 the court held that there was
no obviously exceptional need for the product, therefore it did not
merit comment k protection. 121
The danger of the Hill "exceptional social need" approach is that
it forces drug manufacturers to guess whether there is a subjective
"exceptional social need" 'for a given product before they embark
upon the resource-consuming procedure of development, testing, and
marketing a new drug.122 This approach represents an additional bur-
den on drug manufacturers. Whereas once a drug manufacturer only
had to identify an actual medical need for a given product, injurisdic-
tions following Hill, manufacturers must now determine whether a
jury will deem the product socially necessary.123
Improvements in drugs often proceed gradually. Manufacturers
regularly obtain FDA approval for generic products nearly identical to
those already available because of the low investment, relative to the
possible returns, of doing S0.124 However, under the "exceptional so-
cial need" test, Manufacturer A, which marketed its pain killer first,
might receive comment k immunity while subsequent Manufacturer B
must face a risk-utility test for a generic version simply because there
was arguably no "exceptional social need" for it. Therefore, the first-
in-time manufacturer would enjoy an unfair advantage over its rivals.
Competitors would thus be challenged to either come up with a signif-
icantly cheaper product, or stay out of the market altogether. 125
Given that generic copies of once-patented drugs are widely ac-
cepted and encouraged by the FDA, 126 and given that the availability
of a wide range of therapeutic products is essential to successful treat-
ment of most maladies, 127 the Hill court likely did not intend to create
a "first in time" standard. However, if the Hill court did not intend
120 Id- at 1070 n.9.
121 Id. at 1070-71.
122 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481-82 (Cal. 1988).
123 See Hil4 884 F.2d at 1069.
124 See BURrHOLZ, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that since 1984 the FDA has allowed
producers of generic versions of currently available drugs to gain approval "without requir-
ing the sponsors to duplicate the costly human tests that were required for the originals").
125 The production of bioequivalent drugs is an important source of revenue for most
manufacturers. See id. at 28 (reporting that the production of generic drugs can result in
profits ranging in the millions of dollars).
126 See Jeffrey Yorke, FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.
1995, at 53-54 (discussing the priority placed by Congress, the FDA, and the medical insur-
ance industry on making generic drugs available to the public as soon as possible after
patented drugs have lost their market exclusivity).
127 See HENRY G. GRABowsKi, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION 7 n.18 (1976) (quot-
ing William M. Wardell, Therapeutic Implications of the Drug Lag, CUNICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS, Jan. 1974, at 76) (alteration in original):
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this test, then it could have intended a more insidious one: ajudicial
examination of the use for the product, contrasted against the com-
munity's, or the judge's, moral or religious beliefs of its "value." Thus,
pain killers might qualify for comment k protection, because it is gen-
erally agreed that the alleviation of pain is a good, socially desirable
thing. However, birth control drugs might not meet the "exceptional
social need" test, because the alternative methods of abstention and
coitus interruptus exist.128 Moreover, even pain killers might not be
safe from judicial scrutiny, if the judge or jury believes that other,
more socially desirable alternatives such as acupuncture or prayer ex-
ist.129 Likewise, surgical implants would likely receive protection,
while breast implants might not. But what about breast implants after
mastectomy? Should the judge or jury decide whether they are so-
cially valuable or not? 30 Despite current medical trends, this ap-
proach might encourage more surgical intervention and fewer less
invasive treatments. 13 ' Moreover, and perhaps most insidious, a prod-
uct that is invaluable to a certain group of patients, yet is mis-
prescribed by doctors and abused by certain segments of society,
[A] widened array of choice is important in the treatment of patients even
if the new drugs are no more effective than those already available. Profes-
sor Wardell has pointed out that "Failure to show a difference in efficacy
between a new drug and an older one should not be taken to mean that the
new drug cannot be a worthwhile advance.... First, each drug's efficacy
may be exerted on a different segment of the population; if both drugs
were available, the proportion of patients treatable might be much higher
than if either drug were available alone. By the same argument, a drug that
is 'on average' less effective and more toxic than existing therapy may still
be highly desirable for some segments of the population .... Second, it is
common to find that the spectrum of side effects differs for each drug, or
that the pharmacokinetics are different enough to confer different dosage
regimens upon each drug. Third, in the actual treatment of many types of
conditions, a patient should receive several drugs in turn on a trial-and-
error basis until the one that is best for his needs is determined empiri-
c.ally.... All these factors can be crucial for tailoring therapy to an individ-
ual patient to achieve maximal efficacy, safety, comfort, convenience, and
compliance with the therapeutic regimen. To achieve these goals it is desir-
able to have a number of alternative therapies from which to choose."
128 Hi!!4 884 F.2d at 1070 n.9.
129 See Guido Calabresi &Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VA.. U. L.
REv. 859, 865 (1996). According to judge Calabresi and Professor Cooper, the risk-utility
approach "asks... an agent of the state... to say what actions or products are worth it,
and which are not. It bases liability on the answer given to that question. That strikes us as
a mistake." Id. (footnote omitted).
130 Cf Daniel F. Ryan, III& Timothy R. Lawn, Strict Liability Claims Against Health Care
Providers in Breast Implant Litigation, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 818 (1994) (arguing that cosmetic
nature of breast implants ought to give rise to strict liability on the part of the doctor or
hospital that sells them).
181 This is actually the essence of the holding of a recent case, Volette v. Smith &
Nephew Dyonis, Inc., 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995). In that case, the plaintiff was injured by the
defendant's endoscopic device, used in the treatment of his carpal tunnel syndrome. The
court held that because a clearly safer surgical procedure existed, the device could be
declared "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 12-13.
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might lose comment k protection ifjuries come to see the product in
a negative light.132 In such a climate, drug companies might only pro-
duce drugs for mainstream illnesses, and avoid developing treatments
for those conditions, patient groups, and needs that may offend cer-
tain moral sensibilities.133
2. Absolute Liability
The worst-case scenario for a drug manufacturer is, of course, to
be held absolutely liable for any and all injury that can be causally
linked to its product. The Nevada Supreme Court has adopted this
approach. For example, in Allison v. Merck & Co.,' 3 4 the plaintiff, a
small boy, was inoculated with the defendant's MMR (measles,
mumps, and rubella) vaccine, as required by the local school board to
enter public pre-school.135 He suffered a severe reaction to the vac-
cine and developed encephalitis, which left him blind and mentally
retarded. 36 His parents claimed that the vaccine was defectively
designed. 37 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that the boy's reaction was an "unavoidable danger" associ-
ated with all state-of-the-art MMR vaccines.138 The court instead held
that proof the drug in fact caused the plaintiffs injury was sufficient to
create liability on the part of the manufacturer. 139
The danger associated with this approach is that domestic manu-
facturers of drugs would likely reduce all marketing of drugs that have
even remote possibilities of injury, unless the injury would be minor,
and the profits from the drug large. Potentially injurious drugs, in-
cluding the most common, 14° would increase radically in cost. Essen-
tial but potentially fatal drugs (examples include the Pasteur
treatment for rabies, many vaccines, flu shots, even aspirin)141 would
pose a great monetary risk to manufacturers. Manufacturers would be
forced to either raise their prices drastically, or pull potentially injuri-
132 If this were the rule, the prescription drug quaalude, which during the 1970s and
80s was widely abused as a recreational drug, would be subject to design defect scrutiny
despite the fact that it has therapeutic uses.
133 See Rubin, supra note 113, at 134 (attributing the unavailability of the abortion-
inducing drug RU-486 in the United States to pressure brought upon the government by
religious extremists).
134 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994).
135 See id at 954 n.9.
136 See i& at 951.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 954.
139 See id.
140 Even a drug as commonly used as aspirin can be deadly in some individuals. See
BURKHOLZ, supra note 2, at 14-16.
141 See id
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ous products from the market altogether. The medical purgatory en-
visioned by the authors of comment k would thereby be realized. 142
3. Striving for Balance
One notable case that adroitly navigates the line between protect-
ing public safety while providing incentives to manufacturers to de-
velop and market new drugs, is that of Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical
Products, Inc.143 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
product, ritodrine, a drug prescribed to help prolong her pregnancy,
worsened her pre-existing heart condition, ultimately forcing her to
undergo a heart transplant. 44 She claimed strict liability under fail-
ure-to-warn and defective design theories, and urged the court to find
that the drug's risks-a potential worsening of patients' heart condi-
tions, and perhaps even death-outweighed its benefits, namely, the
increased likelihood of carrying a baby to full term. 45 The court de-
clined to adopt this proposed test, and instead applied a "prudent
manufacturer" test.146 Under this approach, the court held that a
drug was defectively designed only if "an ordinarily prudent manufac-
turer of such a drug, being fully aware of the risks associated with [it]
would not have put the drug on the market."' 47 Given the scientifi-
cally questionable benefits of ritodrine,148 and given reports that
"[r]itodrine is a very potent drug that has side effects that are ex-
tremely disturbing and may be lethal," 149 the Tobin court ruled that
"there was sufficient evidence before the jury to conclude that a pru-
dent manufacturer knowing all the risks would not market
ritodrine."150 By applying this test, the court ordered the manufac-
turer of this dangerous drug to compensate the injured plaintiff, with-
out endangering the availability of the overwhelming majority of
drugs that are potentially injurious, but arguably not dangerous.151
It might be useful to consider how the other jurisdictions might
have decided this case had it been brought before them. Jurisdictions
following Brown would have granted the drug blanket immunity sim-
ply because it is an FDA-approved drug, without any inquiry into its
safety. This assumes, of course, that it was correctly produced as
designed and the manufacturer was not negligent in its warnings of
142 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
143 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
144 See i& at 532.
145 See id. at 536.
146 Id. at 536-37.
147 Id. at 537.
148 See id. at 539-40.
149 Id. at 540.
150 Id.
151 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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the potential dangers associated with the drug. Courts following the
Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Allison would, upon determining
that the drug had, indeed, worsened the plaintiffs heart condition,
have simply found the maker liable for her injuries, without any in-
quiry into the drug's benefits (that is, the number of borderline
pregnancies saved). It is not clear how ajurisdiction applying the Hill
"exceptional social need" test would decide the issue. The outcome
would likely depend on the value attached to extending pregnancies
to term and preventing spontaneous abortions compared to the avail-
ability of socially-preferred alternative methods of prolonging preg-
nancy (acupuncture, extended bed-rest, herbal treatments, surgical
procedures, etc.).
III
THE ALI's PROPOSED STANDARD: SEcTION 8(c) OF THE
PROPOSED RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Proposed Section 8(c): The "Reasonable Health Care
Provider" Standard
As outlined above, many jurisdictions seem uncertain of how to
treat prescription drugs and devices. Despite California's attempts to
shore up the crumbling banks of comment k blanket immunity,152
most jurisdictions have moved away from a pure application of com-
ment k, finding it confusing and difficult to apply fairly.' 53 In re-
sponse, the co-reporters of the Proposed Restatement (Third) have, in
section 8(c), proposed a new rule for the treatment of drug design
defect claims. 154 By proposing the so-called "super negligence"'155
standard of section 8(c), the co-reporters of the Restatement (Third) en-
deavored to strike a balance between protecting the public from "im-
properly" designed and/or marketed drugs, while simultaneously
protecting the development and production of beneficial drugs.' 56
The Restatement (Third) indicates that manufacturers of prescription
drugs and devices can be held liable for injuries caused by their prod-
ucts when the products contain manufacturing defects or when "the
drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective design
or because of inadequate instructions or warnings."'157 The Restatement
(Third) further explains:
152 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
153 See supra Part II.B. See also Cupp, supra note 11, at 87-88 ("The disagreement over
which prescription products merit [comment k] protections... [marks a deep] rift").
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8(c).
155 Schwartz, supra note 97, at 407.
156 RESTATEMENT (TuiRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. f.
157 Id. § 8(b)(2).
664 [Vol. 82:644
NOTE-RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to defective design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits so that no reasonable health care
provider, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic bene-
fits, would prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients. 158
Thus, in order for a plaintiff to claim that the drug or medical
device that injured her was defectively designed, section 8(c) requires
the plaintiff to convince the court that there is no class of patients for
whom this drug is the drug of choice.' 5 9 The plaintiff can still argue
that the drug or device that injured her was manufactured improp-
erly, or that the drug or device was accompanied by inadequate warn-
ings or directions. 160 However, unless the plaintiff can show that no
reasonable physician would have prescribed the product for any iden-
tifiable group of patients, she cannot claim that it was defectively
designed.' 6 1 This is true even if the plaintiff did not belong to the
class of patients for whom the drug in question was the drug of choice
because the proposed Restatement only requires that such a group
exist. 162 When the defendant is able to show that a class of patients
exists for whom there is no other preferred drug available, the plain-
tiff would be limited to arguing either that the drug was improperly
manufactured or that the drug was improperly administered because
of the manufacturer's insufficient warning to the plaintiff's doctor.16
Some commentators have claimed that instead of restating the
law, section 8(c) invents it. 164 Specifically, they claim that the co-re-
porters have created a super-stringent standard that rejuvenates com-
ment k on behalf of defendants, 16 5 while paying mere lip service to
the majority view16 6 that claims of defective drug design ought to be
allowed on a case-by-case basis. There is, however, a fairly substantial
body of case law supporting the section 8(c) approach to the special
158 Id. § 8(c).
159 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1378-79.
160 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8(c) cmt. a.
161 See id. § 8 cmt. f.
162 See id.
163 See id § 8(a)-(b).
164 See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 11, at 98 ("Unlike many of the ALI's revisions to section
402A, its language addressing prescription products is'far from a restatement of present
law.").
165 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1381 (dubbing section 8(c) a "heightened, super negli-
gence standard").
166 Indeed, in their reporters' notes the co-reporters list no less than twelve cases sup-
porting the position that drugs should be subject to some sort of case-by-case risk-benefit
assessment in defective design cases, while citing only Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products
as a case that has clearly "adopted ... the approach taken in § 8(c)." RrTATEMENT
(THiRD), supra note 1, § 8, cmt. f.
19971
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
case of drugs and society's need to ensure their supply. The most
obvious case that supports section 8(c) is the one that the co-reporters
cite in their reporters' note to section 8, comment f: Tobin v. Astra
Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.167 As mentioned above, the Tobin court
held that a claim of defective drug design brought against a manufac-
turer could succeed only if the manufacturer, aware of the risks associ-
ated with the drug, would not have marketed it.168
In this way, the Tobin court, like the co-reporters, attempted to
craft a unique definition of "reasonableness," tailored to apply to the
special area of pharmaceutical products. According to the co-report-
ers, it is reasonable to produce and market a drug or medical device if
it is the pharmaceutical product of choice for at least one group of
patients. 16 9 Again, therapeutic medical products are different from
other products. Depriving ill individuals necessary medical products
can result in serious human suffering. 70 For this reason, reasonable-
ness in design of a medical product should not be analyzed under the
Barker v. Lull approach, which assumes that everyone can live without
products whose dangerous aspects outweigh their overall usefulness to
society. 171 This assumption is simply not true where medical products
are concerned. The lack of a certain drug or medical device can re-
sult in severe suffering, even death.'72 Public policy dictates that med-
ical science provide therapeutic products to those in need as quickly
as possible. 73 Thus, for pharmaceutical products, one must adopt a
view of "reasonableness" that does not apply to other products. 174
Under this special view, it is "reasonable" to take steps to ensure that
the supply of vital drugs is protected. It follows that a drug is "vital" if
167 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
168 Id. at 537, 540.
169 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. f.
170 See Twerski, supra note 23, at 17 ("If we were to take the position that a drug is
defectively designed, when that drug can service a specific group of patients who need the
drug... we would be making a terrible mistake.").
171 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478-79 (Cal. 1988). But see Cupp, supra
note 11, at 99-100. (arguing that manufacturers of products other than drugs or medical
devices could validly claim that certain groups of consumers "need" products that are dan-
gerous to the user and that such a claim is likely to fall on deafjudicial ears).
172 See supra Part II.B.
173 See RESTArEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt f. Moreover, current popular senti-
ment holds that the regulatory system should not stand in the way of medical science's
providing therapeutic products to those who need them. See BuRuuOLz, supra note 2, at
111-13 ("Only after the AIDS community had roared, screamed, and bullied the subject
onto the front pages and the six o'clock news did the FDA begin to stir itself into a search
for a better way to approve certain drugs.").
174 See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 478-79 ("[T]here is an important distinction between
prescription drugs and other products .... "). But see Cupp, supra note 11, at 99-101 (argu-
ing that because no court would grant immunity from design defect claims to manufactur-
ers of consumer products merely on the grounds of social need and consumer desire for
cheaper yet more dangerous devices, pharmaceutical manufacturers should not be granted
such immunity either).
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there is no safer replacement for it for an identifiable class of patients.
If the consumer is injured by a vital drug or medical device, then the
public policy of protecting the supply of such products precludes the
individual from challenging the design of that product. 75 However,
if the product that caused injury is found to be not "vital," that is,
there is no group of patients for whom this and no other product will
do, then the injured plaintiff may claim that the drug or device should
not have been available in the first place. A rule such as the one pro-
posed in section 8(c) serves a dual function: it not only protects the
supply of vital drugs, but it also provides an incentive for manufactur-
ers to market only those drugs that are truly vital.
Once one recognizes that the real issue here is how one defines
"reasonableness" as it applies to the special activity of manufacturing
drugs and prescription devices, 176 it becomes clear that a number of
decisions adhere to the policy of section 8(c).177 For example, in
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath,178 the plaintiff allegedly suffered
kidney failure as a result of taking the defendant's birth-control pills.
The pills contained a higher dose of estrogen than normal birth con-
trol pills and were specifically designed to prevent the "break-
through" bleeding the plaintiff had suffered. 179 Although the court
ostensibly followed the Barker v. Lull "risk-benefit test to measure the
reasonableness of a danger,"'80 it went on to hold that "a comment k
instruction was warranted" as well.' 8' The Heath court then enumer-
ated a four-part test it had developed in a previous case, Belle Bonfils
Mem. Blood Bank v. Hansen'182 to determine if comment k protection of
a drug's design wasjustified.18 3 The test for analyzing the reasonable-
ness of employing a therapeutic product is: "[1] The product's utility
must greatly outweigh the risk created by its use; [2] the risk must be a
known one; [3] the product's benefits must not be achievable in an-
other manner; and [4] the risk must be unavoidable under the pres-
ent state of knowledge."' 84 The court held that because the birth
control drug did what it was prescribed to do, that is, prevent break-
through bleeding, ajury could conclude that its "benefits outweighed
175 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 478-79 ("[T]he broader public interest in the availability of
drugs ... must be considered in deciding the appropriate standard of liability for injuries
resulting from their use.").
176 See Twerski, supra note 23, at 16-17.
177 For a discussion of the problems posed by the current wording of section 8(c), see
infra Part IV. See also Schwartz, supra note 97, at 408-09.
178 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986).
179 See id at 414.
180 Id. at 413.
181 Id. at 415.
182 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983).
183 Heath, 722 P.2d at 415.
184 Id.
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its risks." 185 More importantly, because "Ortho presented testimony
that no other alternative could prevent break-through bleeding and
maintain the same high degree of effectiveness against pregnancy," 18 6
ajury could find that the third prong-"the product's benefits could
not be achieved in any other manner"187-had been satisfied, thus
precluding liability for injury caused by the drug.'88
With the exception of prong number two, which refers to how
much the manufacturer knew of the drug's dangerous propensities,
the Heath/Belle Bonfils approach to the application of comment k ech-
oes that of section 8(c) of the proposed Restatement (Third). So long as
the drug does what it is designed to do, and so long as there is no
other treatment that is safer for this particular ailment, the drug
should be protected from design defect claims.' 8 9 The same test
could be stated as: "so long as there is an identifiable class of patients"
to whom it would be "reasonable" to supply this drug, that is, for
whom this drug works and no other substantially preferable alterna-
tive presently exists, then the court must afford it comment k protec-
tion from "strict liability for consequences attending [its use] ."190
Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.'91 also indirectly supports the rule pro-
posed in section 8(c). In that case, the plaintiff suffered serious side
effects after ingesting the defendant's drug tegretol, a treatment for
trigeminal neuralgia and epilepsy.' 92 Although the court claimed to
apply a risk-benefit test to the drug, it was not the standard it applied
to most products. Instead, the court wrote that "[i] n light of the wise
principles embodied in comment k, it is presumptively inappropriate
for ajury to apply the pure risk-utility test... to a known... risk of a
prescription drug." 93 Discussing- the risk of a pharmaceutical prod-
uct, the court commented that "'risk' in a vaccine or pharmaceutical
case... concerns not only the qualitative harmful effect, but also the
quantitative harm or 'incidence' of serious adverse effects, that is, the
ratios of instances of harm compared to the total use or consumption
of the product.'' 94 Even more significant is the court's statement that
"[r]ather than simply permitting juries to apply, haphazardly and
case-by-case, the risk-utility test whenever harm results, the court must
require, as part of the plaintiff's burden of [proof], an articulable ba-
185 Id at 415.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k.
191 686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La. 1988).
192 See id. at 574, 578.
193 1& at 577.
194 I& at 579.
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sis for disregarding the FDA's determination that the drug should be
available."' 95 Thus, unless the plaintiff can show that the FDA's ap-
proval of the drug was somehow unreasonable or unwarranted, which
means that a "reasonable" FDA, aware of all the risks and therapeutic
benefits associated with the drug, would not have put it on the mar-
ket, then the drug cannot get to the jury under a design defect claim.
The court went on to say that:
[t]here is no showing that any drug other than [Tegretol] is effec-
tive in treating trigeminal neuralgia. Tegretol is indicated only for
those sufferers of psychomotor and grand mal seizures who do not
respond to, or are endangered by, more conventional anticonvul-
sants.... The consequences of the nonavailability of Tegretol for those
patients who suffer serious seizures, which can be fatal if not controlled, but
-who cannot take other anticonvulsants, would be grave, indeed.196
Thus, the Williams court echoed the serious concern that motivates
both section 402 (A), comment k, of the Restatement (Second) and sec-
tion 8 (c) of the Restatement (Third): the fear that strict liability for pre-
scription drug and device design will ultimately deprive a vital drug
from a group of patients in dire need of it.197
A recent First Circuit case also supports the policy underlying
proposed section 8 (c) of the Restatement (Third). In Violette v. Smith &
Nephew Dyonics, Inc.,'98 the First Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with a claim that the defendant's prescription device, designed to
treat carpal tunnel syndrome, had injured the plaintiff, a patient suf-
fering from that ailment.199 At trial, the MagistrateJudge had refused
to invoke comment k and declare the device unavoidably unsafe as a
matter of law.200 The jury found for the plaintiff.20 1 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals analyzed the device in light of the benefits it offered
patients over existing methods of treating carpal tunnel syndrome.
According to the court, " [t] his process involves an examination of util-
ity, risk, and the feasibility of safer alternatives. '202 The court stated
that, based on expert testimony, "the risk involved [in using the defen-
dant's device] was enormous, and . .. the product's use provided no
benefit beyond those available with the safer, proven, alternative tech-
nique of open carpal tunnel surgery."20 3 Because the device did not
provide increased safety or increased efficacy over the alternative, and
195 I.& at 577.
196 Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
197 See Twerski, supra note 23, at 17.
198 62 F.Sd 8 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying Maine law).
199 See id. at 10.
200 See ida
201 See id.
202 Id. at 12-13.
203 I& at 13 (emphasis added).
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because the defendant failed to prove that this device and technique
were the only choice for this (or any other) patient, the defendant
lost. It did not lose simply because there was another technique avail-
able204 or because its device posed a danger and, in fact, caused the
plaintiffs injury.205 Instead, the defendant lost because its device was
not an improvement over the alternative-it was, if anything, more dan-
gerous than the alternative.206 Thus, the court may have believed that
no reasonable professional enterprise, fully informed of the dangers
associated with the device, would make it available to any group of
patients. This approach fully agrees with the spirit of section 8(c) of
the Restatement (Third).20 7
B. The Approach of Section 8(c): A Drug is Defectively
Designed Only If It Has No Business Being on the
Market in the First Place
In Tobin,208 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit created
what may be called a "reasonable manufacturer" test, while a "reason-
able FDA" test seems to have been followed by the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana in Williams.20 9 Moreover, the de-
cision in Violette& 0 suggests that the First Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied a "reasonable medical professional" standard in evaluating
pharmaceutical product design defect claims. Clearly, courts are con-
cerned with ensuring that the drugs and devices on the market are as
safe as possible, while taking care not to render effective pharmaceuti-
cal drugs unavailable to patients who depend on them.21' Yet these
courts, like many others,21 2 are uneasy about closing the strict product
liability door completely on the injured plaintiff. The courts men-
tioned above have responded by allowing the plaintiff to proceed with
her claim that it was unreasonable for the drug or device to even be
on the market. This is what drives section 8(c) of the proposed Re-
statement (Third).
However, no published decision proffers the "reasonable physi-
cian" or "reasonable health care provider"213 as a legal test for deter-
204 Compare id., with Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 116-23.
205 Compare Violette, 62 F.3d 8, with Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994),
discussed supra Part ll.C.2.
206 See Tiolette, 62 F.3d at 13.
207 RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 1, § 8(c).
208 Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1992).
209 Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La. 1988).
210 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995).
211 See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. b.
212 For a discussion of what some other courts have proffered, see supra notes 73-76
and accompanying text.
213 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8(c).
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mining whether or not the drug or prescription device in question is
unavoidably unsafe.214 Professors Henderson and Twerski, the co-re-
porters of the Restatement (Third), assert that proposed section 8(c) em-
bodies the courts' decisions, acceptably replaces comment k, and
protects the availability of effective drugs. It also allows those injured
by 'junk" drugs or devices marketed despite clearly preferable alterna-
tives to seek recovery.215 This Note argues that, for the reasons set
forth below, the best wording of proposed section 8(c) is not the "rea-
sonable health care provider" but rather "the reasonable
manufacturer."
IV
PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED "REASONABLE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER" WORDING OF SECTION 8(c)
A. The "Reasonable Physician" or "Reasonable Health Care
Provider" Does Not Appear in the Case Law
One of the main functions of a Restatement is to survey the law-
that is, to sift through the case law and statutes in order to assemble a
body of work that at once explains the law and guides future lawmak-
ing activities. 216 A search of the case law indicates that no prescription
drug or device design defect case refers to the "reasonable physician"
or to the "reasonable health care provider."217 In Tobin v. Astra Phar-
maceutical Products Inc.,218 the only case relied upon by the co-report-
ers of the Restatement (Third) in support of section 8(c), the court
focused on the "prudent manufacturer."21 9 By asking the courts to
accept this new test, the co-reporters invite criticism and potential re-
jection.220 Judges in jurisdictions whose case law has developed along
214 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1380. Schwartz argues that the reasonable physician
test "has no precedent. Under traditional... tests, the focus is either on the product itself
or on whether a reasonable manufacturer, with knowledge of the risks, would put the
product on the market." Id.
215 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmtL f.
216 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 129, at 866-67 ("[T]he Restatement's influence
depends on whether courts pay attention to it, which in turn depends on whether the
Restatement actually reflects what is happening in the courts.").
217 See Cupp, supra note 11, at 98 ("Unlike many of the ALI's revisions to section 402A,
its language addressing prescription products [in section 8(c)] is far from a restatement of
the present law."); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1381 ("[The reasonable physician test] has no
precedent. Under traditional . . . tests, the focus is either on the product itself or on
whether a reasonable manufacturer, with knowledge of the risks, would put the product on
the market.") (foomotes omitted).
218 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
219 Id. at 540 ("We find that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to conclude
that a prudent manufacturer knowing all the risks would not market ritodrine.").
220 See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, Should Courts Buy the Proposed Restatemen, TRL, Nov.
1996, at 28, 25-26 (arguing that proposed section 8 "illustrates the departure of the [pro-
posed Restatement (Third)] from the foundations of basic tort law").
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the Kearl/Toner risk-benefit approach to pharmaceuticals could well
dismiss section 8(c) out of hand as being unsubstantiated, because no
court has ever employed a "reasonable health care provider" ap-
proach for drug design liability claims. The co-reporters are asking
the courts to apply a test that has never been articulated this way.
221
For this reason, section 8(c) may be shot down before it ever has a
chance to fly, resulting in a continuation of the current "deep rift"
among the jurisdictions.222
Most of the commentators who have spoken to the "reasonable
health care provider" language of proposed section 8(c) have indi-
cated discomfort with it. Even one staunch supporter of section 8(c)
acknowledges the inadequacy of its language, albeit parenthetically:
"[A] n informed and reasonable health care provider would not pre-
scribe the drug [in question] to anyone (or an informed and reason-
able manufacturer would not market the drug) .... '"223 Other
commentators have not been so circumspect in their criticism of the
wording of the test. Professor Richard Cupp comments that the co-
reporters' "reading" of Tobin as the basis for their "reasonable health
care provider" standard is "inaccurate"22 4 and "unclear."225 Moreover,
Teresa Moran Schwartz argues that the "[reasonable health care pro-
vider standard] has no precedent. Under traditional risk-utility tests,
the focus is either on the product itself or on whether a reasonable
manufacturer, with knowledge of the risks, would put the product on
the market."22 6 Schwartz further asserts that section 8(c) is "an artifi-
cial test . . . that could create considerable confusion for the fact
finder .... [It seems] more straightforward and less confusing to ask
whether a reasonable manufacturer, presuming full knowledge of the
risks and benefits of its product, would have put the product on the
market."22 7 Suffice it to say that case law and academic support for
the proposed "reasonable health care provider" standard is sparse at
best, and hostile at worst.
It is even more significant that in their reporters' note to section
8(c), the co-reporters themselves suggest that the proposed "reason-
able health care provider" standard is, for all intents and purposes,
the same as the "reasonable manufacturer" standard:228 "[W]hen a
221 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1381 ("[The language of section 8(c)] has no
precedent.").
222 Cupp, supra note 11, at 85-88.
223 Barrett, supra note 11, at 1326. See also id. at 1295 ("A drug is in [an unreasonably
dangerous] condition if an ordinarily prudent manufacturer... being aware of the risks
... would not market the drug.").
224 Cupp, supra note 11, at 106.
225 Id. at 106 n.182.
226 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1381 (footnotes omitted).
227 Id. at 1383.
228 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. f.
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drug or device provides no net benefits to any ascertainable patient
class-when no reasonable, informed medical provider would pre-
scribe the drug and no reasonable, informed manufacturer would
prescribe it-then the design of the product is defective and the man-
ufacturer should be liable for the harm... . "229 This language sug-
gests that the co-reporters suspect courts will be less than willing to
embrace the proposed "reasonable health care provider" language of
section 8(c). By adding the "reasonable manufacturer" language to
their reporters' note, the co-reporters may hope to increase the
chances that courts accept section 8(c). However, there is no clear
reason why this "equal" standard must be relegated to the reporters'
notes-why courts must be forced to dig for language that is likely to
make section 8(c) more palatable. To do so is to risk rejection of
section 8(c) altogether, because courts are likely to hold that report-
ers' notes are something less than the law. The following section ar-
gues that the proposed "reasonable health care provider" standard
language of section 8(c) is problematic and thus likely to lead to judi-
cial rejection. Given that most commentators prefer the "reasonable
manufacturer" standard over "the reasonable health care provider"230
standard, and given that the co-reporters themselves seem to equate
the two, 231 the ALI should replace the language of section 8(c) with
the "reasonable manufacturer" standard.
B. Physicians Are Inappropriate Standard-Bearers for the
Reasonableness of Pharmaceutical Product Design
In addition to the dearth of case law supporting the "reasonable
health care provider" language of section 8 (c), detractors have argued
that it is improper to rely upon the actions and judgment of doctors to
determine the reasonableness of a given drug or medical device. Tra-
ditionally, doctors have been exempt from liability for any injury
caused by the products they prescribe.2 32 Therefore, sparse case law
exists regarding the reasonableness of physicians' actions vis-a-vis
pharmaceutical prescriptions.2 33 Even if a doctor prescribes a drug
that ultimately injures the patient, a court is likely to deem the doctor
as having engaged in a service, not a sale, and thus simply find her not
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 11, at 98; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1380.
231 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. f.
232 See Ryan & Lawn, supra note 130, at 821 ("[T]he large majority of reported deci-
sions have recognized that a physician or a hospital is primarily providing a service and
therefore is not engaged in the business of selling the product at issue. Under this ration-
ale, most courts have refused to extend the doctrine of strict liability to health care
providers.").
233 Case law on medical malpractice has been developed to an extensive degree, but it
is not clear that a medical malpractice standard is desirable for adjudicating products lia-
bility cases. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1381-82.,
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amenable to suit under a theory of products liability.23 4 For example,
in Magrine v. Krasnica,235 the plaintiff was injured when the needle the
defendant-dentist used to inject a local anaesthetic broke off in his
jaw.2 36 The court held that because he was not a "seller" for the pur-
poses of products liability, the dentist could not be subjected to a
claim of strict products liability.23 7 In a subsequent case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court was called upon to hold doctors and other med-
ical professionals liable for injury caused by the products they pre-
scribed, in the same way that a hairdresser is held liable for injuries
caused by cosmetics that injure customers.238 The court refused to do
so, holding that the dentist or doctor is "engaged ... in a profession"
in which he "exercises his best judgment in diagnosing the patient's
ailment or disability, prescribing and sometimes furnishing medicines
or other methods of treatment which he believes, and in some mea-
sure hopes, will relieve or cure the condition."23 9 The court further
observed that "[n] either medicine nor dentistry is an exact science;
there is no implied warranty of cure or relief.... There is no guaran-
tee that the diagnosis is correct."24° Courts have generally deferred to
the medical professional's best judgment, exempting doctors and
other medical professionals from strict liability for any damage their
prescriptions may cause.241
Furthermore, given the drug manufacturer's tight control over
information relating to its products' efficacy and safety, it seems that
even if a doctor were to prescribe a dangerous drug that should not
be on the market in the first place, such an action would not be pro-
hibited by current medical malpractice doctrine.242 In order for a
doctor to be liable for medical malpractice, she must "have deviated
from the accepted standards of practice and ... this deviation was a
substantial factor in producing the injuries complained of."1243 Medi-
cal malpractice concerns the lapse of the doctor's professional judg-
ment, and the doctor's failure to do everything expected from an
234 SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 4(b) ("Services, even when provided com-
mercially, are not products.").
235 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 241
A.2d. 637 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1968), affid, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969).
236 See id. at 540.
237 See id. at 543-45.
238 See Newmark v. Gimble's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
239 Id. at 702-03.
240 I&. at 703.
241 Cf Aschinger, supra note 11 (arguing that even though physicians are not held
liable for injuries caused by the pharmaceutical products they sell, they should be held
liable for harm caused by products that are purely cosmetic in nature and aggressively
marketed by the prescribing physician).
242 See WALTER G. ALTON, JR., MALPRAcrIcE: A TRIAL LAWYER'S ADVICE FOR PYSIC'tANS
(How TO AVOID, How TO WIN) 21-22 (1977).
243 Id. at 3-4.
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ordinary professional in the field.244 The drug manufacturer is in a
much better position to design drugs and inform doctors of their uses,
efficacy, and dangers than are physicians.24
It is practically impossible for a doctor to keep abreast of the
broad field of medical product innovation. 246 Doctors are busy peo-
ple, with very demanding caseloads, and it is often difficult for them
to keep up with new developments, even in their own fields, much less
in the field of pharmacology.2 47 Most doctors are not in a position to
collect data on the drugs they prescribe, nor to keep track of side
effects that patients experience, except on a local, anecdotal basis.
Doctors generally do not subject new drugs to their own animal, com-
puter, or human tests.248 According to one commentator:
Both drug manufacturers and prescribing physicians are potential
... cost avoiders when it comes to obtaining... information about
the risks of pharmaceutical products. As far as the generation of
basic research on product safety is concerned, pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers are clearly the cheapest cost avoiders. Not only do drug
manufacturers have superior resources to devote to research, but
they are already required to conduct a thorough investigation of
product related risks... [by the FDA]. In contrast, physicians have
neither the resources nor the expertise to conduct basic research
on the biochemical properties of the pharmaceutical products that
they prescribe.2 49
Moreover, doctors often continue to prescribe medical products
with which they are familiar, even when the safety of the product
comes under question or safer products of equal efficacy become
available.2 50 The reasonable physician is one who reads the material
supplied by the manufacturer, who listens to the information pro-
vided by the ubiquitous pharmaceutical salesperson,25' and acts ac-
244 Seeid.
245 See Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775 (RI. 1988) (asserting that
pharmaceutical manufacturers are the experts who retain the responsibility for protecting
the public from danger).
246 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1382 ("[P]hysicians are flooded with promotion
materials and often are unable to keep abreast of pharmaceutical developments.").
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use
of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1229 (1996).
250 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1382 n.160 ("[E]ven though Darvon has been shown
to be no more effective for pain relief than aspirin and poses risks of addiction, doctors
continue to prescribe it, so that sales of the drug continue in the range of $100 million a
year.") (citing Michael S. Wilkes & Miriam Shuchman, Pitching Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 88).
251 See id. at 1382 n.157. According to Schwartz, "The [pharmaceutical] industry has a
sales force of 'detailers' who number about 45,000 and who visit doctors' offices on a regu-
lar basis. They constitute 'the primary source of information on new drugs.'" Id. (citing
DONALD DRAKE & MARIAN UHLMAN, MAKING MEDICINE: MAKING MONEY 25 (1993)).
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cordingly. Doctors are literally inundated by pharmaceutical makers'
advertising. Pharmaceutical manufacturers spend millions of dollars
each year to convince doctors that their products are useful, reliable,
and safe.252 Because of the difficulties involved in accessing in-
dependent, objective information about the efficacy of each drug on
the market, it is not unreasonable for a physician to rely upon manu-
facturers' representations. 253 Thus, the "reasonable health care pro-
vider" language of proposed section 8(c) renders it an unworkable
standard when used to determine whether a given drug should have
been marketed by the manufacturer. 254
Moreover, because the "reasonable health care provider" stan-
dard is likely to affect a jury's objectivity, courts may hesitate to em-
ploy section 8(c) as written. Juries tend to be deeply swayed by the
testimony and opinions of doctors and are inclined to defer to their
professional judgment.2 55 In almost all prescription drug and device
cases, a doctor recommended the drug or device to the patient, and
the doctor was instrumental in procuring the product, either via pre-
scription or direct sale.256 Medicine is an inexact science.257 Reason-
able doctors are too busy to keep up with every new development,258
and thus their reliance on information provided by drug manufactur-
ers is generally deemed reasonable. 259 Therefore, it is easy to see how
an injurious product prescribed by a qualified doctor may be enough
to persuade a jury that the prescription of the drug was reasonable,
regardless of the drug's harmfulness. 260
Thus, as currently written, section 8(c) provides the manufac-
turer of an unreasonably dangerous product a shield against design
defect claims-the act of the medical professional who prescribed the
product. The co-reporters acknowledge this eventuality, warning
"[t] hat some providers do, in fact, prescribe defendant's product does
not necessarily suffice to defeat plaintiff's claim. Evidence regarding
the actual conduct of health care providers, while relevant and admis-
sible, is not necessarily controlling."26' However, critics like Schwartz
252 See GARBER, supra note 2, at 21 ("[Pharmaceutical product] marketing competition
is often fierce and costly.... Sales promotion efforts are extensive even for drugs with no
present competitors.").
253 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1382.
254 If recent studies on drug manufacturers' advertising practices are accurate, such a
standard may be necessary. According to Schwartz, "Recent studies have found that drug
advertising is often inaccurate and unreliable." Id.
255 See id. at 1381-82.
256 Cf. RES-rATEMENT THiRD, supra note 1, § 8 cmt. f.
257 See Schwartz, supa note 7, at 1382.
258 See id.
259 See id. at 1382 n.157.
260 See id. at 1381-82.
261 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 cmt. f.
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note that juries are likely to give "great weight" to the actions of the
actual physician(s) involved.262 Judicial awareness ofjurors' tendency
to defer to physicians may lead courts to reject this new standard, in
fairness to the plaintiff.2 63 Moreover, even if the jury is instructed not
to consider the actions of the particular health-care givers who pre-
scribed the product, it may still find the drug prescription reasonable,
given the representations, advertising, and information provided to
the medical community by the manufacturer. As a result, courts are
likely to find the proposed "reasonable health care provider" test un-
acceptable, especially those jurisdictions that have developed case law
that allows the factfinder to subject prescription drug design claims to
a case-by-case risk-benefit analysis. 26 This existing case law may, in
turn, keep the courts from wholeheartedly embracing the rest of the
Restatement (Third).2 65
In short, the "reasonable health care provider" standard may po-
tentially protect manufacturers who knowingly place products on the
market that simply should not be there, given the extreme risk associ-
ated with the product. For example, imagine that thalidomide had
actually been approved for sale in the United States.2 66 Assume, also,
that despite learning that some women in Europe who had taken
thalidomide had given birth to severely deformed babies,267 the
maker disregarded the risk and continued to market the drug as the
only "completely safe" tranquilizer "for pregnant women."268 Because
it is reasonable for a doctor to prescribe a drug that she believes to be
safe, and because the company claimed that this was a safe tranquil-
262 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1381-82.
263 See generally id. (arguing that both comment k and section 8(c) unfairly protect
defendant pharmaceutical makers to the detriment of injured plaintiffs).
264 See Cupp, supra note 11, at 98 ("Over the years, jurisdictions have developed sub-
stanally different approaches to the doctrine. It seems doubtful that they will quickly
abandon their existing case law in favor of the ALI's proposed new approach.") (footnote
omitted).
265 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 129, at 866-67. Indeed, Professor Henderson
himself has noted that courts may not universally accept the Restatement (Thirdy "I believe
the [new] Restatement will have normative force. The prestige of the [ALI] will give it
weight. However, I doubt that every court will adopt it."James Henderson, Revising Section
402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TouRo L. REv. 107, 108 (1993). Adopting a
problematic standard such as the unsupported "reasonable health care provider" will only
increase the potentiality of rejection of the Restatement (Third).
266 This actually nearly happened but for the efforts of a few well-placed skeptics. See
BuRmOLZ, supra note 2, at 43 ("That thalidomide was never marketed in the United States
was largely due to the stubborn skepticism of the FDA's Dr. Frances Kelsey .... She fought
a dogged defensive battle, blocking and parrying every attempt by Richardson-Merrell to
gain approval ....").
267 See id. at 42 ("Mothers who took [thalidomide] ... produced children with a wide
but distinctive range of deformities. Some had no arms, just flippers extending from the
shoulders.., others were born with just a head and a torso. It was the nightmare come
true of every prospective parent.").
268 Id. at 43.
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izer to prescribe for an identifiable patient group-pregnant wo-
men-under proposed section 8(c), the actions of the health care
providers who prescribed the drug should be considered reasonable.
If thalidomide were in fact the only "available" tranquilizer for preg-
nant women, then section 8 (c) automatically confers immunity. How-
ever, if other drugs are available for the patient class, then section
8(c) requires that juries engage in the mental gymnastics of imputing
the knowledge held by the manufacturer to the prescribing physician,
then asking if, given that information, the doctor would still have pre-
scribed it.269 Additionally, the jury must take into account the repre-
sentations of safety the manufacturer actually made to the physician,
and the inherent reasonableness of the physician's reliance on such
information. 270
Thus, courts are likely to find that the language of section 8(c)
forces the jury to take unnecessary steps to (1) gauge the mental state
of the manufacturer; (2) ascribe the mental state of the manufacturer
to the reasonable physician; and (3) then determine if the physician
would have prescribed the drug to any patient, given all available in-
formation, including that provided by the manufacturer itself. Courts
will likely resist a rule that would at best force the jury to make ab-
stract mental leaps, and at worst automatically grant a manufacturer
immunity in the face of a conscious choice to sell a drug that clearly
should not be on the market. The co-reporters themselves equate the
"reasonable health care provider" standard with the "reasonable man-
ufacturer" test.2 71 If so, there is no clear reason why the rule of sec-
tion 8(c) cannot be written to direct the finder of fact to determine
whether a reasonable manufacturer of prescription drugs and devices
would have marketed the product in the first place. This inquiry is
not the same as asking if the FDA should have approved the product
or not. This distinction is addressed in the next section.
C. The "Reasonable FDA" is not a Satisfactory Standard
1. The FDA Is Not Equipped to Determined the Public Need for the
Product in Question
The average pharmaceutical company profits by identifying
promising patient populations that need new treatments.2 72 Manufac-
269 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 242-54 and accompanying text.
271 See RESTATEMENT (TumD), supra note 1, § 8 cnt. f.
272 SeeJeffrey P. Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, FDA CONSUMER,
Jan. 1995, at 3 ("In some cases, a pharmaceutical company decides to develop a new drug
aimed at a specific disease.... [I]n... others, new findings from university, government
or other laboratories may point the way for drug companies to follow in their own
research.").
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turers employ their own researchers; 273 in addition, the average phar-
maceutical manufacturer sponsors research conducted by scientists at
academic research centers all over the world.2 74 Manufacturers,
through their employees, monitor various medical fields, and amass
information in the form of articles, case reports, as well as direct cor-
respondence from researchers, doctors, and other professionals.2 75
To survive, the manufacturer must spot potentially profitable areas, 276
and then either improve existing medications or produce novel treat-
ments. Once it identifies a target area, and finds a possible treatment,
the drug company performs extensive tests on the prospective prod-
Uct 277 Tests are done at the molecular level, in vitro, then in vivo,
using animals.2 78 Based on these test results, the drug manufacturer
decides whether a market exists for its product.2 79 The manufacturer
then begins the procedure for approval with the FDA by submitting
an Investigational New Drug Application ("IND").280 The IND con-
tains information, compiled by the manufacturer, on the drug's
"chemistry, manufacturing, pharmacology, and toxicology."28' Once
the FDA approves the IND, the manufacturer then collects further
data on "clinical safety and efficacy needed for a New Drug Applica-
tion ('NDA'), the formal license application."282 The NDA must in-
clude "very detailed reports [by the manufacturer] of all animal
studies and clinical testing performed with the drug, reports of any
adverse reactions, and any other pertinent information from world-
wide scientific literature."28 3 Throughout this process, the FDA must
rely upon the manufacturer for the data essential for approval.2 84
273 See id,
274 SeeJUDnrrH AREEN ET AL, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 336-39 (1984).
275 See Cohn, supra note 272, at 3.
276 See Douglas R. Dennis, What Impact Will Health Care Reform Have on Vaccine and Drug
Makers?, 62 DEF. COUNS.J. 165, 169 (1995). See alsoJohn Henkel, OrphanProducts: NewHope
for People with Rare Disorders, FDA CONSUMER, Jan. 1995, at 47-49 (analyzing the govern-
ment's response, in the form of funding and guaranteed market exclusivity, to the problem
of "orphan disorders," namely, diseases affecting otherwise unprofitable populations of less
than 200,000 patients).
277 Cohn, supra note 272, at 3-4.
278 See id.
279 See Henkel, supra note 276, at 48 (indicating that the most important factor in a
drug company's decision to proceed with the development of a new drug is the drug's
"money making potential").
280 See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1312-13.
281 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1991) (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(1) (Supp. 1991)).
282 Id. See also Barrett, supra note 11, at 1312-13.
283 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 96 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (Supp. 1991); 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.50 (1990)).
284 See Cohn, supra note 272, at 5 ("FDA physicians, scientists and other staff review test
results submitted by drug developers. The purpose: ... to decide whether the drug can be
sold to the public .... ."). Recently ajapanese university researcher was allegedly bribed by
an American drug company to skew research results to support the efficacy of the com-
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Once the manufacturer convinces the FDA and its panel of experts285
that the drug is safe, the FDA grants its approval.28 6
This system, however, is far from fool-proof. Even though the
agency's regulations and procedures governing the approval of pre-
scription drugs are "extensive,"2 7 one commentator has reported that
the FDA "has failed on a number of occasions to prevent violations of
these regulations, and... allowed unsafe drugs to reach or stay on the
market."288 A variety of deregulatory pressures may compromise the
FDA's effectiveness.28 9 High-ranking members of Congress and the
administration have been known to lobby the FDA on behalf of a com-
pany whose product is undergoing FDA review.2 90 Large, influential
associations such as the American Medical Association have argued
that FDA regulations may make valuable drugs unavailable to patients
in the United States.291 Meanwhile, public opinion also plays a role in
the regulatory process. According to Paul J. Quirk, 'When FDA ac-
tions offend public opinion... Congress [is] ready to consider revers-
ing them. Congress legislatively reversed the FDA's vitamin and
mineral regulations and delayed implementation of the saccharin
ban."292 The public demand for laetril, which at one time was
thought to be a miracle cure for cancer, led Congress to introduce a
bill "to legalize laetril by eliminating proof-of-efficacy as a require-
ment for drug-marketing approval. ' 293 According to Quirk, "cases of
intense public opposition are significant not only because of the possi-
bility of legislative or judicial reversal, but also because they threaten
pany's drug. This illustrates the power drug companies wield, even over supposedly in-
dependent entities like universities. See Prosecutors Begin Questioning Professor Over Bribery,
Japan Econ. Newswire, Nov. 26, 1996, available in WESTIAW, Farnews, Japan Econ. New-
swire file.
285 See Grundberg; 813 P.2d at 96 ("The application is reviewed by physicians, pharma-
cologists, chemists, microbiologists, statisticians, and other professionals within the FDA's
National Center for Drugs and Biologics who are experienced in evaluating new drugs.")
(citing 47 Fed. Reg. 46626 (Oct. 19, 1982)).
286 After granting approval, the FDA requires the manufacturer to continue to moni-
tor any adverse effects of the drug post-approval. "All reports of adverse drug reactions
('ADRs') must be reported to the FDA .... The manufacturer must also periodically
submit reports as to what actions it took in response to ADRs and must submit data from
any post-marketing studies, reports in the scientific literature, and foreign marketing expe-
rience." Id. at 96-97 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b)-(c)).
287 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97.
288 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1387.
289 See PaulJ. Quirk, Food and DrugAdministration, in THE PoLrrics oF REGULATION 191,
211 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
290 See id. at 211-12.
291 See id. at 213 ("By the mid-1970s, disaffection of the medical profession with the
FDA had become quite severe. State and national medical conventions passed resolutions
calling for reduction of the agency's authority.").
292 Id. at 214.
293 Id.
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the agency's political support and its access to needed resources." 294
Perhaps the entity that has the most intense effect on the FDA is the
pharmaceutical industry. Quirk comments:
Undoubtedly the most significant pressure on the FDA to ap-
prove drugs results directly from industry lobbying of the agency. In
the drug-evaluation process there are necessarily frequent contacts
between agency officials and representatives of drug companies....
Such contacts on a regular basis over a period of years may strongly
shape the attitudes of FDA officials. Moreover, there are no regular,
direct contacts between reviewing officials and any parties inclined
to oppose drug approvals. In addition to its psychological effects,
this lobbying imbalance also creates an imbalance of information
and analysis-arguments favorable to a drug approval will be discov-
ered and articulately put by company representatives while criti-
cisms must be discovered by the reviewer unassisted. 295
The FDA is overworked 296 and underfunded.297 New develop-
ments in the pharmaceutical field are increasing, in both number and
complexity, especially in the field of prescription medical devices. 298
However, given the recent political emphasis on a "laissez faire" ap-
proach to agency regulation of the pharmaceutical industry,299 and
the current fervor for budget slashing and deregulation, 00 the FDA
cannot sufficiently oversee the development and safety of each drug
that passes before it.301
2. The Outcome of the FDA's Approval Process is Largely Determined
by the Manufacturer
The only way to determine the need for a proposed pharmaceuti-
cal product is to review the data available to the manufacturer at the
294 Id.
295 Id. at 211.
296 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1388 ("In addition to regulating drugs and medical
devices, [the FDA] is responsible for food, radiological products, and cosmetics .... Over
8,000 different drugs fall under its jurisdiction. Some 16,000 device manufacturers are
registered with the agency.").
297 See id, ("In the 1980's the overall size of the [FDA's] staff was reduced by 7.5% and
the agency's budget grew by only 2% in constant 1980 dollars. By the end of the decade,
the FDA estimated that it needed 2,000 more positions to carry out its responsibilities.").
298 See id. at 1389.
299 See genera/!y Ken Flieger, FDA Finds New Ways to Speed Treatments to Patients, FDA
CONSUMER, Jan. 1995, at 19-22 (outlining the "numerous steps" the FDA has taken to
"shorten the time devoted to pre-approval testing").
300 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1388; Clinton Offers Middle-Class Tax Cuts in Budget
Plan, SATT=n TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3218577 (reporting that the Repub-
lican Congress is likely to be hostile to any requested increases in the FDA's budget).
301 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1387-88; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 13.
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time it proposes the drug for marketing.30 2 Such relevant data in-
cludes the product's risks relative to its benefits. Determining reason-
ableness demands an overview of the relevant market and those
products already available. Products that provide even marginal im-
provement over those already on the market, for even a single patient
group, should be made available. 303
Yet the FDA alone is unable to make this reasonableness determi-
nation. Rather, the FDA relies heavily on the drug manufacturers to
in effect regulate themselves. It gives only a "cursory" review of medi-
cal devices before approving them for the market.304 Its current level
of regulation of prescription drugs has been described as "lax."305 In
one case, an arthritis drug was given approval despite the fact that the
same drug had caused a number of fatalities overseas. Within four
months of the drug's appearance on the market, it had resulted in
around fifty deaths and even more lawsuits.30 6 The maker took the
drug off the market before the FDA took any action.3 07
Given the FDA's increasingly scarce resources and its extensive
and necessary reliance on industry,3 0 8 as well as the courts,30 9 the "rea-
sonable FDA" is clearly not a viable standard for drug design claims.
In fact, it may be "reasonable" for the FDA to approve a dangerous
product in reliance on the manufacturer's data. The FDA commonly
allows producers who violate its regulations to continue their busi-
ness,310 safe in the knowledge that the FDA is too bureaucratically
bound-up to take effective action against it.311 The realization that
the FDA sometimes cannot guarantee prescription product's safety
has led some courts to hesitate before declaring FDA approval as pre-
empting products liability claims involving drugs and prescription de-
302 See RicHARD M. GOODMAN & PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, DRUG LABILIT A LAwyER's
HANDBOOK § 5.2, at 324 (1970) ("The development of new drugs in the United States is
primarily the product of the initiative of private manufacturers.").
303 See GRABOWSKI, supra note 127, at 7 n.18 (describing the therapeutic importance of
the availability of a variety of treatments for a given ailment).
304 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1392-93.
305 Id at 1395.
306 See id. at 1396-97 (describing the use of the drug Oraflex).
307 See id. at 1397.
308 See Quirk, supra note 289, at 212.
309 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1386 ("[T]he FDA lacks the general subpoena power
that other agencies have, and therefore, in most instances cannot compel the disclosure of
information about product risks. Sometimes through tort litigation, the information does
come to light, and the FDA is able to use it to initiate regulatory action.") (footnotes
omitted).
310 See BuRmoLz, supra note 2, at 20 ("[A]IIl too often [the FDA] ceded [its] authority,
or declined to exercise it. It was clearly in the interests of the agency to punish incompe-
tence within its ranks, and to reward diligence, but all too often the opposite occurred.").
311 See id. at 26-27 (reporting on "the ineffectiveness of the [FDA enforcement] system,
as well as the inefficient and industry-oriented attitudes of the FDA reviewing officers").
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vices 12 (although many state legislatures are increasingly willing to do
so). 3 13
In addition to being a less-than-ideal source of protection for con-
sumers of pharmaceutical products,314 the scope of the FDA's author-
ity is statutorily limited315 to the simple determination of whether or
not a new drug's "safety and effectiveness"3 16 are adequate for market-
ing approval.317 The FDA determines safety by performing a risk-ben-
efit analysis on the product
No drug is completely safe or without the potential for side effects.
Before a drug may be approved for marketing, the law requires the
submission of results of tests adequate to show the drug is safe
under the conditions of use in the proposed labeling. Thus, "safety"
is determined case by case and reflects the drug's risk-vs.-benefit
relationship.318
The FDA is not required to ask whether or not the drug or medi-
cal device under consideration is a desirable addition to, or an im-
provement over, those products already available.3 19 The FDA deals
with each product on a case-by-case basis, as if in a vacuum.3 20 In-
deed, the producer itself may claim that the product is a significant
improvement over existing products, in which case the FDA may grant
the new product "priority" status that entitles it to expedited review.321
All other drugs and devices are designated "standard" and subjected
to a slower (twelve-month) review process.3 22
Thus, the FDA does not consider whether the product under
scrutiny is significantly more dangerous than existing products. When
it first requests FDA review, the manufacturer has the option of dem-
onstrating that the product in question provides a significant improve-
312 See, e.g., Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 965 (Nev. 1994) ("[C]omment k
should not provide blanket protection to all drug manufacturers of any FDA approved
drugs.... ").
313 See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 (Utah 1991) (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 78-18-2(1) (Supp. 1990)).
314 See GimER, supra note 2, at 33 (discussing low FDA standards and the detection of
non-compliance with its current standards). "Clearly, the FDA does not have the re-
sources" to effectively guarantee pharmaceutical product safety. Id.
315 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994).
316 Originally, the FDA's statutory mandate was to ensure drug safety. In 1962 the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was amended to require the agency to determine the "effec-
tiveness" of new drugs. See GitABowsm, supra note 127, at 11-12.
317 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994).
318 Dixie Farley, Benefit vs. Risk. How FDA Approves New DruIgs, FDA CoNsuMER, Jan.
1995, at 29.
319 See GOODMAN & RHEINGOLD, supra note 302, § 5.2(C) (1) (noting that so long as the
manufacturer meets its burden of convincing the agency that its proposed product is effec-
tive and safe, the FDA will approve it).
320 See /d
321 See Farley, supra note 318, at 25.
322 See id.
1997]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ment over available products, only if it desires expedited review.3 23
After that determination, the issue does not arise again.
The FDA's statute requires it only to determine the "safety and
efficacy" of this drug, on its own terms, for its intended purpose, vis-a-
vis the disease or disorder it is designed to combat.3 24 The FDA does
not undertake a comparative analysis as part of the approval pro-
cess.325 The FDA does not consider whether, aside from the product's
general risks in comparison to its benefits, there are products out
there designed for the same purpose that are clearly preferable for all
groups of patients.326
Undoubtedly, providing a wide range of therapeutic choices to
health care providers benefits patients. Similar products can affect
different patients differently; thus, doctors need an array of therapeu-
tic products to best serve their individual patient 3 27 But preserving
similar products to treat the same disease assumes that no alternative
treatment available is significantly worse than its competing products.
Stated otherwise, the therapeutic need to preserve a variety of treat-
ments3 28 does not require the availability of a treatment that would
never be a reasonable choice, given the alternatives, for any patient or
group of patients.
In short, under the current FDA approval process, manufacturers
have the responsibility to identify potentially profitable patient popu-
323 See i&
324 See id. at 29.
325 See GpauowsKi, supra note 127, at 17-37 (attributing market forces, rather than in-
creased regulation, to a measurable decrease in the approval of "unimportant" drugs.).
Essential to Grabowski's analysis is the fact that, for approval purposes, the FDA does not
distinguish between "unimportant" new drugs (those that offer little or no improvements
over existing drugs) and those representing "modest or major therapeutic advances." IdM at
21. See Farley, supra note 318, at 24 ("[C]ontrolled clinical trials are especially important
because they provide the only basis, under law, for demonstrating effectiveness.") (emphasis
added). FDA approval hinges upon only two issues: effectiveness and safety. See id. at 29.
Relative therapeutic value is simply not an issue in the approval scheme.
326 However, the FDA has recently shown a willingness to consider asking a manufac-
turer of a drug to pull that product from the market if a clearly safer alternative is available.
See TomJackman, Seldane Producer Sues Riva4 KANAS Crnr STAR, Feb. 8, 1997, at B1 (report-
ing that the FDA considered pulling its approval of the antihistamine Seldane in response
to the makers release of a safer form of the drug). However, this evaluation affects only
older drugs on the market, and does not enter into the decision as to whether or not to
approve a given new drug. Furthermore, given the close relations of drug companies to the
FDA, it is likely that the FDA will merely ask a company to remove an outdated drug from
the market. See id. Thus, due to considerations other than consumer safety the FDA allows
arguably unreasonably unsafe drugs to remain on the pharmacist's shelf. See supra notes
287-95 and accompanying text.
327 See GRAowsru, supra note 127, at 7 n.18.
328 See id. at 7.
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lations,3 29 design new products, test them, garner FDA approval, and
convince doctors to prescribe them.330 As the political climate con-
tinues to inhibit the government's regulation of drugs and medical
devices, 331 the profit-motivated manufacturer alone will make the cru-
cial decisions. Drug makers, not drug regulators, will decide whether
or not the product will reach the patient population. For this reason,
the jury must adjudicate the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
decisionmaking, "reasonableness" meaning whether an identifiable
group of patients, given all the information available to the manufac-
turerat the time of sale, required this drug.3 32 In short, the proper test
is: given all the data available to the manufacturer at the time of mar-
keting, and the state of the market at the time, was it reasonable for
the manufacturer to make and sell this product?
D. Only the "Reasonable Manufacturer Standard" Can Respond
When a Manufacturer Withholds Improved
Pharmaceutical Products from the Market
Proposed section 8(c) has a further weakness, as it does not ad-
dress the situation where a manufacturer has a clearly preferable
product available, but chooses to withhold it and markets an inferior
one instead. This weakness makes it more likely that courts will reject
section 8(c) as unworkable.333 Under proposed section 8(c), when a
product on the market is the drug of choice for at least one group of
patients, that is, the best drug or device available to treat them, the
product should not be subject to claims of defective design, no matter
what the side effects are.33 4 Courts may well accept the policy argu-
ments that drive this standard.335
Moreover, courts are likely to agree with how this new rule works
when two or more products on the market are designed to treat a
patient class, but have clearly disparate benefits and levels of safety. If
the safer drug is clearly preferable to the one in question under all
329 See Henkel, supra note 276, at 47-48 (noting that profitability considerations are
essential to the pharmaceutical producer's decision whether or not to undertake to de-
velop and market a new drug).
330 See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96-97 (Utah 1991).
331 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1385 (arguing that budget constraints have left the
FDA inadequately staffed, and, as a result, the tort system functions "as a greater deterrent
to unsafe practices than the regulatory system itself").
332 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 129, at 865-66 ("[T]he [proposed] Restate-
ment's test would impose liability only for harms that were reasonably foreseeable.").
333 See supra notes 217-31 and accompanying text.
334 This analysis assumes, of course, that the manufacturer sufficiently warned the pre-
scribing physician of the product's known dangers. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1322-23.
335 See id. at 1297 ("[Tlhere is a strong possibility that [section 8(c)] will provide a
resolution to the controversy over the underlying policy concerns of strict liability and
comment k.").
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circumstances, 33 6 without being prohibitively costly, then clearly no
reasonable manufacturer would have placed it on the market. But
what about the case in which there is only one drug available on the
market for an identifiable group of patients, yet the plaintiff learns
through discovery that the manufacturer had in fact determined how
to make the product safer, but decided not to? Imagine that just
before marketing the product in question, the manufacturer discov-
ered a new, much safer one, but because it had invested so much in
the first drug, it decided to keep the new one secret until it had
recouped its costs. Under the proposed language of section 8(c),3 3 7
because the drug that caused the injury was the only one available, the
reasonable physician had no choice but to prescribe it.
The manufacturer may have perfectly reasonable safety explana-
tions for withholding substantially improved drugs and devices.338
However, a company might choose to delay producing a superior
product for a variety of profit-motivated reasons. For example, a com-
pany might desire to "sit" on a new or improved product when the
one it already is currently marketing has been heavily advertised, espe-
cially if the better product is more expensive to produce, or if the
revelation of the improvement might somehow tarnish the image of
the product currently on the market.33 9 It is conceivable that a re-
searcher toiling away in an isolated facility might come up with a safer
form of product X, only to find that the sponsor, the holder of the
patent through a research sponsorship deal, squelches any word of
the development until the "time is right."34 Although one hopes that
drug companies do not operate in this way, it is evident that, at least
336 That is, it does not fulfill medical science's requirements for diverse yet similar
treatments in order to account for individual differences. See GRABowsKI, supra note 127,
at 7 n.18.
337 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8(c).
338 It would be interesting to see whether courts would allow marketing or profit con-
siderations to count as legally acceptable reasons to withhold substantially better medical
products. In the case of non-medical products, the trend has been to disallow such a "rea-
sonableness" defense.
339 For a comparable example, the drug manufacturer Hoechst Marion decided to
continue to sell its antihistamine Seldane despite the fact that it came out with an arguably
safer equivalent product, Allegra. This occurred despite the FDA's proposal that the com-
pany pull the older product from the market for safety reasons. See Jackman, supra note
326.
340 For researchers, drug company funds can be a major source of income. SeeAndrea
Rock, The Lethal Dangers of the Billion-Dollar Vaccine Business, MoNEY, Dec. 1996, at 148, 153-
55 (reporting that one influential pediatrician, who previously found that the DPT vaccine
was dangerous to a large number of children, but who now regularly defends the actions of
vaccine manufacturers against charges of irresponsibility, was the recipient, both directly
and indirectly, of approximately $1.2 million dollars in fees and unrestricted research
funds from one major DPT manufacturer).
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on some occasions, some do.341 As it is currently written, section 8(c)
does not require a manufacturer who is in litigation, and, thus, subject
to discovery, to defend the reasonableness of its actions. No matter
what damage it caused, no matter how many fatalities, so long as the
product in question was the only one on the U.S. market that could help
the class of patients identified, then the fact finder must concede that
the reasonable physician would have had no choice but to prescribe it.
Even if the manufacturer is responsible for an improved drug not be-
ing on the market, it does not have to answer to the jury. Courts are
likely to see this outcome as unfair, and may reject section 8(c) on
these grounds.
Admittedly, such cases should not be common. Drug companies
are subject to a variety of forces that motivate them to produce safer
products. 42 However, given that the FDA's review of new drugs is
limited to their individual safety and efficacy,3 43 it is tempting for
manufacturers to target large patient populations with new drugs and
devices that pass the FDA's minimal scrutinyPa44 If the consumer pop-
ulation is large enough, the producer can profit greatly by convincing
a sufficiently large number of physicians (or by directly convincing the
patients themselves) to use the product, notwithstanding its compara-
tively lower safety level.345 Moreover, the FDA is often reluctant to
pull its approval, even when the product in question is much more
841 See id. at 150. In recent years, American drug companies have actively kept a safer,
more effective DPT vaccine off the market simply because the one they currently produce
has a much higher profit margin. According to one researcher,
you can produce a much less toxic [DPT vaccine] in very low yields, and I
think anyone who has worked on pertussis knows this* ... What we are
really faced with is... going from a vaccine that costs literally cents to
produce to one that.., is going to cost dollars to produce.
Id. at 153.
342 See GARBER, supra note 2, at 103 (asserting that even without a products liability
system, market and other forces would act to force dangerous drugs off the market, "albeit
more slowly").
343 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994).
344 See GARBaER, supra note 2, at 165. Garber refers to medical products designed for
large patient populations and having the potential of generating huge revenues as
"blockbusters":
A potential blockbuster has enormous profit potential. The top performers
in the industry have achieved $1 billion a year in worldwide sales, and the
annual profits associated with such a product may be on the order of one-
half this figure. For a product believed to have this kind of profit potential,
even a large proportionate reduction in the investment incentive [due to
predicted losses associated with the product's relative danger] is unlikely to
deter a company from proceeding.
Id.
345 See Rock, supra note 340, at 153 (reporting that drug manufacturers pay out huge
amounts of money to keep doctors thinking that their products are safe, even when newer,
safer ones become available).
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dangerous than anticipated.346 Therefore, only manufacturers are
able to effectively replace outmoded products with better ones. If in-
jured plaintiffs are denied the opportunity to challenge the reasona-
bleness of the manufacturer's decision to market, or continue to
market, an inferior product, the result is likely to be perceived as un-
just. A similar sense of injustice inherent in the argument that the
manufacturer's desire for huge profits can justify its disregard for
safety concerns may have led the majority of courts to move away from
granting blanket immunity for drug design claims- 47
E. Failure to Convince the Jurisdictions to Adopt a Uniform
Approach to Drug Design Defect Claims Will Result in
Inconsistencies, Inequities, and Confusion
Given that the majority of courts are moving away from blanket
immunity for drug design defect claims, 348 it seems to be in everyone's
interest to settle upon a newer and more equitable standard. Patient
groups need new pharmaceutical products. Meanwhile, pharmaceuti-
cal producers need to assess liability risks before embarking upon the
research and development of new products.349 Failure to do so is
likely to give rise to inconsistent results and confusion across the juris-
dictions, resulting in drug manufacturers engaging in strategic behav-
ior on a state-by-state basis.350
The current state of comparative negligence jurisprudence illus-
trates some of the problems that could result if the approach to drug
design defect claims varies from state to state. Historically known as
contributory negligence, the common-law rule regarding plaintiff's
346 See generally id. (reporting that drug companies continue to market the relatively
dangerous polio vaccine despite the existence of a safer acellular version).
347 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 1314 ("[T]he vast majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the issue have cast aside the 'blanket immunity' of comment k.. .
348 See id.
349 See GAPBF-, supra note 2, at 159. Garber asserts that:
The incentive to invest in clinical trials is even more sensitive to liability
risks than the incentives to introduce a product that has already been devel-
oped. For example, unusual liability risks as discouraging as a 1 percent
annual probability of product failure reduces the incentive to invest in
clinical trials by about 15 percent. Unusual liability risks as discouraging as
a 4 percent probability of product failure reduce this incentive by about
one-half.
Garber's analysis is based on the assumption that comment k serves to block most pharma-
ceutical product claims. Id at 39 ("[P]rescription drugs and biologicals are not often
subjected to liability for design defects."). However, Garber warns that "if the liability envi-
ronment were very different from the prevailing one, the market and regulatory environ-
ments might differ as a result." Id- at 78. Given the general risk aversion of most
pharmaceutical makers, an unsettled design liability environment is very likely to cause
them to develop fewer new drugs and devices, and to focus instead on producing and
promoting already-existing ones. Cf. id. at 159.
350 See i.
[Vol. 82:644
NOTE-RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
fault was simple: if the finder of fact assigned any amount of fault to
the plaintiff, he was totally barred from recovery.3 51 The injustice of
this rule became apparent to modem jurists, for it allowed even the
most negligent of defendants to escape all liability simply by proving
that the injured plaintiff had also been at fault, however slightly.3 52
Courts and legislatures began to agitate for a more equitable ap-
proach to dividing the fault between plaintiffs and defendants. 353
Although an absolute bar on recovery may seem unfair, it is diffi-
cult to establish an alternate rule that all will agree is a desirable re-
placement. In the case of contributory negligence, various
jurisdictions came up with disparate replacements. 35 The modem
rules that have developed to replace contributory negligence fall
under the general heading of "comparative negligence."355 Some
states apply a so-called "pure" form of contributory negligence, in
which the finder of fact determines the amount of damage caused by
the defendant's action or defective product, then reduces that
amount by the percentage of fault it assigns to the plaintiff for the
injury.35 6 Other jurisdictions follow a variety of "modified" forms of
contributory negligence. In some of these jurisdictions, the plaintiff s
negligence must be less than the defendant's in order for the plaintiff
351 SeeVicro E. SCHwARTz, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1986) (not-
ing that the comparative fault rule was firmly established in the case of Butterfield v. For-
rester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809)). According to Schwartz,
In [Butterfield; the] plaintiff was injured by a fall from his horse when, rid-
ing at a fast pace, he ran into an obstruction left in the road by defendant.
The court held that, under these circumstances, plaintiff could not recover.
Butterfield became the principal authority for the contributory negligence
rule-that when a plaintiff's negligence contributes to the happening of an
accident, he cannot recover damages from a defendant who negligently in-
jures him.
I. Schwartz goes on to report that Butterfield "was given full and broad application in the
nineteenth and occasionally in the twentieth century. In fact, in 1854 a Pennsylvania judge
called the contributory negligence defense a 'rule from time immemorial' and ventured to
guess that it was 'not likely to be changed in all time to come.'" Id. § 1.2, at 4 (footnotes
omitted).
352 See id.
353 See id- ("It is only recently thatjurisdictions in this country have in substantial num-
bers joined the trend [away from contributory negligence and toward comparative negli-
gence]. However, the contributory negligence rule has been on the decline in most states
for much of the twentieth century.... .") (footnotes omitted).
354 See id. §§ 1.3-.6, at 9-27 (tracing the history of transformation from contributory
negligence to comparative negligence in the United States).
355 See id. § 2.1, at 29 ("The term 'comparative negligence' [may] be used to describe
any system of law that by some method.., apportions costs of an accident, at least in part,
on the basis of the relative fault of the responsible parties."). Six states and the District of
Columbia still follow the contributory negligence rule. See Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Com-
parative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisons for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. Rzv. 199, 200
(1990) ("The doctrine of comparative negligence.., has supplanted contributory negli-
gence in forty-four states.") (footnote omitted).
356 See ScawARTz, supra note 351, § 2.1 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993) (noting that 12
states and Puerto Rico have adopted "pure comparative negligence.").
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to recover. This is known as the "forty-nine percent rule,"35 7 for if the
plaintiff's fault is equal to or greater than the defendant's fault, the
plaintiff recovers nothing.358 However, other jurisdictions apply a
"fifty percent rule" under which plaintiffs whose fault is found to be
equal to that of the defendant may still recover.3 59
Different comparative negligence rules can result in very differ-
ent results in similar cases, depending on the state in which they are
heard. In pure comparative fault states, even very negligent plaintiffs
can hope for at least some amount of damages; if the amount of dam-
ages set by the jury is high, even the collection of a small percentage
can mean that a very negligent plaintiff can still collect a large sum of
money.3 60 In addition, the different approaches to comparative negli-
gence taken by the various jurisdictions have caused uncertainty and
various strategic behavior from state to state.361
The current movement away from the blanket immunity rule for
drug design claims is similar in nature to the movement away from
contributory negligence in that both were prompted by concerns of
fairness to injured plaintiffs.362 However, if the rule regarding drug
and medical device design-defect claims is allowed to develop in the
same hodge-podge manner that has been the hallmark of contribu-
tory negligence, 363 confusion and potentially detrimental variations in
behavior are likely to result. The frequency of claims and judgment
amounts are likely to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Given
pharmaceutical makers' high level of sensitivity to increases in poten-
357 See id § 2.1 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993) (reporting that 12 states have adopted the
49% rule).
358 See id.
359 See id § 2.1 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993) (noting that so far 20 states have adopted
the 50% rule).
360 See Mutter, supra note 355, at 251-52 (reporting a number of cases in which plain-
tiffs responsible for significantly more than 50 percent of the accidents that led to their
injury nonetheless were granted awards, ranging from $3,500 (for a plaintiff adjudicated to
be 99% responsible for his injuries) to $1.1 million (for a plaintiff found to be 70% respon-
sible for the accident that caused his injuries)).
361 See idL at 241-42 (citing a number of studies that have found the changeover from
contributory negligence to comparative negligence to have been responsible for an in-
crease in claims ranging from 6% to 20%, depending on the jurisdiction studied).
362 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 351, § 1.4, at 10 (asserting that the contributory negli-
gence defense was favored by American courts interested in protecting burgeoning indus-
tries, but that "the very harsh treatment of injured [plaintiffi] by the [contributory] fault
system... led to demands for abolition or modification of the system"). Cf Barrett, supra
note 11, at 1325 (arguing that most jurisdictions have rejected blanket immunity for drug
design defect claims because the "'blanket immunity' test is overreaching in its efforts to
protect the manufacturer," and that "[Blanket immunity] contradicts the entire reasoning
behind strict liability which was designed to protect the consumer").
363 See supra notes 351-61 and accompanying text.
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tial liability,36 manufacturers are likely to either (1) avoid investing in
the long, expensive process of new drug development,365 focusing in-
stead on improving products already available in profitable mar-
kets;3 6 6 and/or (2) market new products only in jurisdictions offering
extended protection of designs, and refuse to sell the same products
in "risky" jurisdictions with unsettled or more liberal rules.367 More-
over, manufacturers may lobby for increased protection from design
claims from the legislatures of states with large patient populations,
and may leave smaller states to their own devices. As a result, patients
with certain afflictions may find it necessary to travel thousands of
miles to receive more effective, albeit more risky, treatments. This is
not a future that the ALI is likely to favor.
Thus, in promulgating section 8(c) of the Restatement (Third), the
AL seems to be taking steps to avoid the comparative-negligence like
chaos that is likely to result from the adoption of varied approaches to
drug design defects. However, the extent to which the jurisdictions
are willing to accept this proposed standard is the extent to which
American jurisprudence will avoid comparative-negligence like confu-
sion and contradiction. As mentioned above, the "reasonable health
care provider" language of section 8(c) may prove to be problematic
for some judges, 6 8 who may reject the proposed standard. Instead,
the ALI should adopt a "reasonable prescription products manufac-
turer" standard, one that protects manufacturers from design liability
for injury caused by prescription products, so long as they can show
that marketing the product was reasonable by medical standards369-in
other words, it was the product of choice for at least one identifiable
group of patients.
CONCLUSION
Products liability law evolves and changes. Even the most stalwart
exemptions are subject to revision, for example, section 402A's com-
364 See GARBER, supra note 2, at 159-62 (asserting that even slight increases in the risk of
potential liability can cause pharmaceutical producers to drastically scale back production
and marketing efforts).
365 See Cohn, supra note 272, at 2-3 ("FDA estimates that, on average, it takes eight and
a half years to study and test a new drug .... Drug companies spend $359 million, on
average, to develop a new drug.... ")
366 See GARBER, supra note 2, at 164 (asserting that even slight risks of increased liability
"can deter R&D investments in products with limited profit prospects"). Moreover,
"[e]ven very substantial liability risks may be insufficient to deter investments in developing
products that are viewed as potential blockbusters." Id. at 165.
367 See id. at 159 (reporting that even moderate liability risks can "reduce [the incen-
tive to invest in clinical trials] by about one-half").
368 See supra Part IVA-B.
369 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988) ("[T]here is an impor-
tant distinction between prescription drugs and other products such as construction ma-
chinery. . . .") (citations omitted).
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ment k. No longer is blanket immunity the norm for prescription
drugs and devices.370 The courts are now struggling to find a fair re-
placement for comment k, one that ensures a thriving pharmaceuti-
cals market yet also allows the injured plaintiff to challenge the
reasonableness of the product's presence in the market. Indeed,
given FDA regulation and market forces, one might conclude that
most medical products on the market are as safe as possible, that they
cause more good than they do harm. Yet in light of the enormous
amounts of money at stake in the global pharmaceutical industry,
371
manufacturers are inevitably tempted to market products that are
clearly less effective and more dangerous than others. Manufacturers
must be held accountable for the decision to market products with no
comparative therapeutic value.
Into the fray steps the ALI with section 8(c) of its proposed Re-
statement (Third). The approach of proposed section 8(c) is to allow
juries evaluating an injurious prescription drug or device to put them-
selves in the shoes of the reasonable physician, with reasonableness
defined as a willingness to make this drug available if there is at least
one identifiable group of patients for whom it is the best product,
even if that "group" is composed of one patient. The proposed rule
has been called "the best approach to resolving [the debate] sur-
rounding strict liability exceptions for prescription drugs."3 72 Pro-
posed section 8(c) is an equitable standard, because it allows
individuals to bring drug and medical device design claims, while at
the same time satisfying the public policy goal of ensuring that thera-
peutic products will remain available to those who need them. A
plaintiff can win on a design defect claim only if she can show that no
identifiable patient(s) needed the product that caused her injury. The
problem lies not with the proposed standard's policy, but rather with
its use of the "reasonable health care provider" language. The reason-
able doctor is captive to the market, and can only prescribe what is
currently available. The reasonable physician is not in a position to
make products safer, to invest money to accelerate research of promis-
ing replacements, or to amass data on the product. Reasonable doc-
tors do what the reference materials compiled by drug and medical
device manufacturers tell them to do.37  The responsibility for gaug-
370 See supra Part H.B.
371 For example, in the world's ten largest markets, sales in the first three quarters of
1996 alone amounted to over 100 billion dollars. SeeDaniel Green, Pharmaeutical Sales Rise
in World' Biggest Markets, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 25, 1996, at 5.
372 Barrett, supra note 11, at 1327.
373 For an example of a popular reference material for practicing physicians provided
by a drug manufacturer, see The Merck Manual, published and distributed by the Merck
Research Laboratories. THE MERCK MANUAL (Robert Berkow & Andrew J. Fletcher eds.,
16th ed. 1992).
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ing the market and the relative need for its products rests squarely
upon the manufacturer's shoulders.
For this reason, the ALI should adopt the "reasonable manufac-
turer" approach proposed in Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products,
Inc.3 74 Failing this, the courts should read this language into section
8(c) and instruct the finder of fact in such cases to consider whether
the manufacturer acted reasonably, given the special circumstances of
the medical marketplace. This approach will function to protect vital
pharmaceutical products, while simultaneously holding manufactur-
ers accountable for marketing unreasonably unsafe products that of-
fer neither essential variety3 75 nor any discernable improvement over
safer, existing products. If the courts do not choose to follow this fair
and equitable modification of proposed section 8(c), manufacturers
and patients are likely to find themselves in the unsure, chaotic world
ofjurisdiction-by-jurisdiction rule. In such a world, the availability of
prescription products will vary from state to state, depending on the
approach taken by the courts of the locale. In such a regime, there
are few winners.3 76 The list of losers will undoubtedly include both
the manufacturers of pharmaceutical products as well as the sick and
suffering individuals who may be denied the treatment they so criti-
cally need.3 77
Jeffrey D. Winchester
374 993 F.2d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 1993).
375 See supra note 127.
376 Of course, the obvious winners in such a regime always include the lawyers on both
sides.
377 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478-79 (Cal. 1988) ("[T]he broader
public interest in the availability of drugs at an affordable price must be considered in
deciding the appropriate standard of liability for injuries resulting from their use.").
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